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The Duty To Be a Rational Shareholder 
David A. Hoffman 
[I]n evaluating disclosure, as we must here, we continue to 
assume rationality and that all participants approach the 
situation thinking as Economic Man, within Adam Smiths 
definition, seeking to follow the lead of Smiths Invisible 
Hand.1 
American public shareholders are uniquely blessed by the 
freedom to do what they will with their capital. Unlike other 
stakeholders, shareholders owe the corporation no legal duties.2 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, The James E. Beasley School of Law, 
Temple University. J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., Yale College. I am grate-
ful to Dan Filler, Craig Green, Rick Greenstein, Mitu Gulati, Duncan Hollis, 
Peter Huang, Katrina Kuh, Don Langevoort, Dan Markel, Mike OShea, J.J. 
Prescott, Ivan Preston, Jeff Rachlinski, Larry Solum, and Kaimi Wenger for 
providing insightful commentary at various stages in the completion of this 
project. I presented some of the ideas contained in this paper to a faculty 
workshop at Temple University and received very useful feedback. Olga Yev-
glevskaya-Wayne, Bernice Melamud, and Allison Brill provided research as-
sistance. Ms. Yevglevskaya-Wayne in particular provided thoughtful help, in-
cluding work on data-gathering and entry, while collecting a wide variety of 
sources. The statistical analysis contained in this Article would have been im-
possible without the help of James Degnan of Temple Universitys Office of 
Measurement and Research, who donated his time and expertise. Additional 
expertise came from Dr. Alan Sockloff, whose work was generously supported 
by Temple Law School. In that regard, I thank Dean Robert Reinstein, and 
John Necci of Temples library, who provided institutional assistance. All er-
rors are mine. 
 1. Chock Full ONuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212, 219 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 2. See 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5713 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000) (Ordinarily, 
at least unless the shareholder is a majority shareholder or active in the man-
agement of the corporation, he has no well-defined duties. (internal footnotes 
omitted)); Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary 
Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 20611 (2004) (discussing the basic corporate 
law framework of shareholder rights and duties); see also Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 22223 (1980) (holding that purchasers of stock who do 
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Shareholders provide cash, and, in exchange, receive manage-
ments fiduciary fealty and limited voting and distribution 
rights.3 This framework respects the difficulties that share-
holders face in contracting to protect their rights and is conven-
tionally summarized by a simple moral: The only promise that 
makes sense in such an open-ended relation is [for manage-
ment] to work hard and honestly.4 Indeed, the absence of bi-
lateral duties is an unstated organizing principle of every dis-
cussion of corporate governance.5 
Or so the story goes. In reality, courts hold purchasers of 
securities6 to something similar to a duty of care. Courts re-
quire investors to investigate their purchases, to coldly process 
risk, to disregard oral statements of optimism, and in general 
to be economically rational. If investors fail to meet these ex-
pectations, judges deny them the protection of the securities 
laws. In this way, courts impose on public securities investors a 
special kind of legal duty, novel in scope and, I will argue, un-
grounded in principle.7 
 
not otherwise have a relationship of trust and confidence with other parties to 
the transaction owe no duties to corporations or potential shareholders); cf. 
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 11.11 (2d ed. 2003) (de-
scribing fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders to minority share-
holders). 
There are two minor exceptions to the no-duty rule, apart from the major 
one identified in this Article. First, shareholders wishing to file derivative ac-
tions have a duty first to make a demand on the board. See generally COX & 
HAZEN, supra, § 15.04. Second, the statute of limitations may be seen as a 
duty to inquire about the underlying facts of a securities claim. See, e.g., 
Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 3. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power 
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
581, 623 (2002). 
 4. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991) (emphasis added) (articulating the 
dominant economic view of corporate governance). 
 5. We may appreciate how different a contrary regime might be by con-
ducting a thought experiment. Imagine that when you buy a share of stock, 
the law imposes a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. You 
proceed to hedge your investment, choosing (foolishly) to short your own stock 
instead of a competitors. The stock price falls. You decide to liquidate your po-
sition, making a modest profit. Would the corporation or your fellow share-
holders sue you for breach of the duty you owe them? Yes, as corporations 
would look like partnerships; under such circumstances, your liability would 
be limited only by your fealty and assets. 
 6. As used in this Article, the term securities includes debt. Similarly, 
the term shareholders includes debtholders throughout. 
 7. See infra notes 28185 and accompanying text for a discussion of why 
victims duties in the context of securities fraud have economic effects that 
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Surprisingly, although some of the legal doctrines that col-
lectively constitute this duty have been present for almost 
thirty years, no study to date has considered the scope of ra-
tionalitys burden as imposed through the materiality doc-
trine.8 Nor have commentators addressed the potential demo-
graphic and redistributive consequences of judicially 
privileging certain classes of investors or the collateral effects 
of imposing investor duties on the mainstream of corporate law. 
This Article takes up these topics. 
To recover under securities laws, such as the Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 1934,9 private plaintiffs or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)10 must prove by a substantial 
likelihood that a suspect corporate disclosure omitted (or mis-
represented) material facts. An omitted fact is material if 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
 
make them look like more traditional Hohfeldian duties. 
 8. Bainbridge and Gulatis recent work is the first, to my knowledge, to 
begin the task of a controlled empirical investigation of the materiality doc-
trine. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maxi-
mize? (The Same Way Everybody Else DoesBoundedly): Rules of Thumb in 
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002); cf. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create Good Securities Fraud Doctrine? 
51 EMORY L.J. 309 passim (2002) (commenting on Bainbridge and Gulatis 
study). Unlike the present study, Bainbridge and Gulati do not analyze the 
rates at which courts apply the various immateriality techniques in the case 
law, relying instead on a behavioral explanation for why such techniques 
might be effective or attractive. See generally Bainbridge & Gulati, supra. 
Quantitative case law analysis of disclosure outside of the securities fraud 
context is just beginning, but it has already produced one particularly inter-
esting analysis of common law disclosure duties. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & 
Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Test-
ing the Meta-theories (UNC Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 04-4, 2004; 
Georgetown Law & Economics Research Paper No. 614501, 2004), available at 
http:ssrn.com/abstract=614501 (analyzing 466 decisions and testing results 
against the conventional theories explaining when disclosure is required). 
 9. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000); Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 207475 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the materiality precedent 
is interchangeable in federal securities laws). 
 10. See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of Materiality Un-
der U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 66263 (2004) 
(describing the close relationship between the SEC materiality standard and 
Supreme Court case law). The SEC rewords the traditional case law standard 
in its enforcement decisions to define a reasonable investor as one who gener-
ally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a companys profit-
ability and financial outlook. Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Direc-
tor, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, to Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC 2 
(May 8, 2001) http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2001/LSEC-Wolf.pdf, (de-
scribing the long-standing SEC position). 
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would consider it important in deciding how to vote.11 But who 
and what is a reasonable investor?12 In tort and contract law, 
reasonableness has a subjective component and an objective 
one: reasonable people act in ways that meet societal expecta-
tions, while remaining true to a subjective understanding of le-
gal duties and rights.13 The securities law standard is similar,14 
but courts choose an objective approach.15 
Adjudicating securities cases under the reasonable-
investor standard, courts confront a dissonance between what 
forces they believe will move marketsdisclosure of informa-
tion affecting a firms financesand the relatively trivial dis-
closures that plaintiffs claim created market effects.16 To re-
solve this tension, courts have developed the doctrine of 
immateriality as a matter of law,17 which allows judges to pre-
 
 11. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44849 (1976) 
(adopting a rule for 14a-9 proxy actions); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (expressly adopting the TSC Industries standard of mate-
riality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context). 
 12. Both reasonable and investor have multiple variants: rational, 
prudent, informed, lay, and typical; shareholder, stockholder, businessman, 
man, and person. See Richard L. Epling & Terence W. Thompson, Securities 
Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39 BUS. LAW. 855, 89193 (1984). 
 13. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 117, 118 (2000); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §§ 7.9, 7.10 (4th ed. 2004); see also Piambino v. 
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1320 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogizing reasonable investor to 
the torts standard of a reasonable person). For a thoughtful discussion of the 
reasonable person standard and in particular, an introduction to the aretaic 
conception of reasonableness, see Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory 
Lexicon, http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com (Oct. 5, 2003, 16:55 EST) (Le-
gal Theory Lexicon 049: Distributive Justice Introduction). 
 14. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. 
 15. See generally Epling & Thompson, supra note 12, at 89495 (discuss-
ing the preference for an objective, rather than subjective, standard for rea-
sonable investor); Lee, supra note 10, at 664 (discussing the standard of ob-
jective reasonable investor as used in TSC Industries). There are alternative 
accounts. For example, Bainbridge and Gulati describe the emergence of pre-
sumed immateriality doctrine as a method for judges to quickly and easily 
deal with constraints on their time and resources. See Bainbridge & Gulati, 
supra note 8, at 11331; cf. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 31418 (concluding 
that a rapid embrace of the antirationality defenses represents a shift in the 
ideology of the judiciary leading to a pronounced pro-defendant bias). I com-
ment on these stories in Parts IIIV, infra. 
 16. Courts have rejected a quantitative test, which would make market 
reaction necessary and sufficient to find materiality. See Lee, supra note 10, at 
66465; cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(discussing market reaction as relevant to materiality determination). 
 17. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 20822105. Similarly, some 
disclosed information is presumptively material. See Note, Should the SEC 
Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1434 
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sume a reasonable shareholder would have ignored certain 
types of fraudulent statements. Immateriality as a matter of 
law is thus best seen as presumed immateriality. It is the 
scope and nature of presumed immateriality that creates the 
duty to be a rational shareholder. 
Conventional wisdom holds that courts rarely presume 
immateriality.18 Courts say they are applying a standard that 
is self-consciously limited: the materiality judgment requires 
delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable share-
holder would draw . . . and these assessments are peculiarly 
ones for the trier of fact.19 Similarly, jurists, although applaud-
ing the courts applications of presumed immateriality,20 con-
clude that materiality issues in securities cases are almost al-
ways left for jury resolution.21 Only very recently have some 
 
(2002) (concluding that business operations in a foreign company under gov-
ernment sanction are likely to be treated as material per se). 
 18. My own experience as a lawyer representing defendants is that many 
believe it nearly impossible to win on materiality before summary judgment. 
Of course, apart from its perceived rarity, the fact-dependent nature of the 
materiality standard may create a degree of frustration among practitioners. 
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider 
Trading: A Call for Action, 2003 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 114868 (analogizing 
the materiality standard to the Hogwarts sorting hat, and arguing that ambi-
guity in the standard creates problems for lawyers and clients in evaluating 
risks and benefits of disclosure). 
 19. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). The TSC 
Court elsewhere rejected a less-stringent standard, stating that materiality 
was not merely something a reasonable shareholder might consider impor-
tant. Id. at 446. 
 20. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: 
Analyst Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (2004) (noting with approval a Second Circuit 
case upholding a finding of presumed immateriality so as to prevent disclosure 
of an avalanche of trivial information (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448)). 
 21. See Epling & Thompson, supra note 12, at 895 (Accordingly, the in-
ference of such an investors actions is the responsibility of the trier of fact and 
normally is not susceptible to resolution on summary judgment.); Edward A. 
Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits 
of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 
U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 100 ([T]he materiality standard applied by the court is ex-
ceedingly fact-specific and therefore peculiarly appropriate for application by 
the trier of fact.); Terry Fleming, Telling the Truth SlantDefending Insider 
Trading Claims Against Legal and Financial Professionals, 28 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2002) (Motions for judgment on the pleadings and sum-
mary judgment are rarely granted . . . .); Heminway, supra note 18, at 1183 
(linking the ill-defined legal standard to difficulty in resolving cases pre-
trial); Robert A. Rosenfeld & Clyde J. Wadsworth, Materiality After Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, 378 PLI/LIT 275, 291 (1989) (questioning the viability of summary 
judgment on materiality issues following Basic); Paul Vizcarrondo & Andrew 
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begun to question this conventional account.22 
In this Article, I present evidence that courts dismiss secu-
rities claims on the ground of presumed immateriality in half of 
opinions considering materiality.23 This is a surprising and sig-
nificant finding. To the extent that I have identified a good set 
of judicial reactions to securities lawsuits, materiality acts to 
exclude a large number of claims and plaintiffs from the securi-
ties-fraud system. The mechanism of this exclusion is a judi-
cially created set of commitments and assumptions regarding 
how reasonable investors act. That is, presumed immateriality 
reflects a normative judicial commitment distinguishing be-
tween investing behavior entitled to protection from securities 
fraud and behavior which is not.24 
To understand this ideological commitment, my empirical 
analysis turned to presumed immaterialitys rationales. This 
Article finds evidence that courts implicitly25 equate investors 
reasonableness with economic rationality, and irrationality as 
unreasonableness.26 This decision cannot be explained as a 
 
Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 
1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Act of 1934 in UNDERSTAND-
ING THE SECURITIES LAW 6 (2004) ([Q]uestions of materiality are usually for 
the jury to decide.). 
 22. Bainbridge and Gulati, analyzing a set of one-hundred randomly se-
lected securities cases, note briefly that ninety-one were decided at the motion 
to dismiss stage, and over 70 percent of those involved materiality determina-
tions in favor of defendants. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 116 
n.94; cf. COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that presumed immateri-
ality determinations arise with some regularity); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fes Shadow: the SECs Pursuit of Managerial Ac-
countability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 479 (2001) (noting the stunning willing-
ness of judges to decide difficult materiality issues as a matter of law); R. 
Gregory Roussel, Note, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the 
Corporate Puffery Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 105051 (1998) (Before 
Congress responded to frivolous private securities fraud class action . . . the 
judiciary took it upon itself to provide relief to burdened corporations.). 
 23. This finding applies to private plaintiff suits only. Overall, the 
blended rate is slightly less than 50 percent. See infra Part II. 
 24. See generally Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme 
Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of 
Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 111 (2005) (arguing that many courts 
appear to view the reasonable investor as referring to a normative idealized 
type of behavior, instead of a descriptive realistic depiction of actual behav-
ior). 
 25. And sometimes explicitly, as in the Chock Full ONuts case cited at 
the head of this Article. Chock Full ONuts Corp. v. Finklestein, 548 F. Supp. 
212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 26. See infra Part III. Others have suggested that judges ought to correct 
for human irrationality through the common law. See, e.g., Stephen Choi & 
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simple reflection of the way shareholders actually respond to 
information: it is an ideological choice. 
Shareholders behavior deviates from economic rationality 
in both predictable and unpredictable ways; individuals suffer 
from a variety of cognitive biases, heuristics, and social 
norms.27 In law, these deviations from rational expectations 
have been described by a growing literature adapted from be-
havioral economics.28 Part I of this Article reviews recent be-
havioralism literature, with a special focus on the experimental 
results with which behavioralists have undermined traditional 
assumptions of shareholder rationality. 
Part II discloses the very different model of rationality em-
bodied in federal securities decisions. It analyzes 472 federal 
securities opinions from the Second Circuit and its district 
courts to explore those courts willingness to require sharehold-
ers to act like economically rational actors, a fictional legal con-
struct. As a part of my analysis, I evaluate several hypotheses, 
principally, that presumed immateriality: (1) will appear rela-
tively rarely in the dataset; and (2) will be directed at corporate 
activity (disclosure) and not investor response (purchase or 
sale). These hypotheses reflect the conventional wisdom about 
presumed immateriality, but mine is the first study to test 
them in a systematic way.29 
 
Adam Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47
50 (2003) (describing a model of intermediate scrutiny for judges attempts to 
affect investor behavior). Choi and Pritchard argue that courts, unlike regula-
tors, are subject to market-like constraints on their ability and have already 
created a materiality standard that reflect[s] the cognitive limitations facing 
investors. Id. at 48. However, Choi and Pritchard caution that courts may 
face their own biases, may be tempted to shunt cases from their dockets by 
creating bright-line rules, and may unthinkingly follow foolish precedent. Id. 
at 50. 
 27. For a discussion of the relationship between individual irrationality 
and the hypothesis that markets act to clear such behavior, see infra notes 
4752 and accompanying text. 
 28. The corpus of behavioral law and economics literature is vast and still 
expanding. Traditional accounts situate its origin in the work of Robert Ellick-
son and Herbert Hovenkamp. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Hu-
man Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-
Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4 (1994); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (presenting a variety of perspectives 
on the topics of behavioral law and economics); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) (discussing the malleability of decision making). 
 29. In the last few years, there have been several important empirical in-
vestigations of securities fraud doctrine. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 
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Part III discusses how courts presumptions about reason-
able-investor behavior (manifest in the reasons they give for 
findings of immateriality) are in tension with the findings of so-
cial science research on human decision making (described in 
Part I). In particular, I focus on how courts justifications for 
presumed immateriality have moved from fact-intensive inves-
tigations to bright-line tests based on the language contained in 
disclosures. 
In Part IV, I build on my empirical analysis by describing 
how the widespread application of the presumed immateriality 
doctrine creates a common-law duty of rationality.30 I make 
predictions about the market effects of the duty of rationality, 
which, if true, would suggest that the application of the securi-
ties laws may have deep and potentially unintended redistribu-
tive and demographic effects.31 
At its heart, when its scope is appreciated, presumed im-
materiality begins to look like a product of the courts struggle 
to control the behavior of two very different kinds of partici-
pants in the system of securities regulation: investor-plaintiffs 
and juries. Presumed immateriality, because it assumes
 
8, at 87 n.12 (analyzing 100 randomly selected cases from 1996 through 2001, 
and reaching certain limited conclusions regarding plaintiffs success rate in 
materiality analyses); Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of Security: An Empirical 
Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307 (2000) (analyzing courts treatment of the term se-
curity); Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 80304 
(2004) (analyzing a database of cases discussing the fraud by hindsight doc-
trine); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical 
Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2005) (analyzing pleadings standards 
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and concluding 
that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a significantly more restrictive test of 
fraud than the Second Circuit); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 903, 92830 (2002) (describing the change in percentages of 
complaints surviving dismissal post-PSLRA as arising from judicial heuris-
tics); Michael A. Perino, Strategic Decision Making in Federal District Courts: 
Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions (St, Johns Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 05-013, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=727905 
(analyzing 268 opinions from federal district courts considering motions to dis-
miss after 1996). 
 30. As far as I can tell, I am the first to suggest that this duty positively 
accounts for some securities fraud doctrines. However, Donald Langevoorts 
commentary on prior empirical investigations questioned whether judges were 
projecting their own ideal of how they would act as investorsprone to self-
attributions that overweight the level of caution and skepticism that they 
bring to their decisionmaking and thus to their construal of reasonable-
ness . . . . Langevoort, supra note 8, at 317. 
 31. See infra notes 26876 and accompanying text. 
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contrary to real-world evidencethat investors act rationally, 
transfers power from juries to judges. It imposes formidable 
cognitive burdens on investors seeking to be protected from 
fraud. The entire construct (courts presumptions, the scope of 
immateriality, and a resulting investor duty to be rational) 
seems in turn to be based on the courts need to harmonize se-
curities law with the foundational assumption of corporate law: 
that all parties to the corporate form act rationally. It is to this 
assumptionand the evidence that undermines itthat I now 
turn. 
I.  BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS 
Traditionally, hornbook law and academic literature de-
scribed common shareholders as rational actors,32 and the as-
sumption remains implicit in the minds of all concerned with 
doing business under the corporate form.33 Rational share-
holders are able to anticipate and consider all relevant factors 
in making choices and . . . they have unlimited computational 
capacities.34 
Rational shareholders know what they want and select it 
in the most efficient way available.35 Rational shareholders do 
not speculateunless the risk/benefit calculation justifies 
speculation. They do not buy stocks based on Internet rumors.36 
 
 32. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003); Pat-
rick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 178 (1988); cf. Chock Full ONuts Corp. v. 
Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 33. Ryan, supra note 32, at 178. 
 34. Paredes, supra note 32, at 434. 
 35. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the 
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998) (analogizing rational persons to rats 
which are at least as rational as human beings when rationality is defined as 
achieving ones ends . . . at least cost). Hanson and Kysar describe the ex-
pected utility theory by noting its four principal decision-making principles: 
ordering (people must prefer either one [object to another] or be indifferent to 
both); continuity (if the odds are right, a person will always gamble); inde-
pendence ([a] persons preferences between two objects should remain un-
changed when the objects are substituted into identical lotteries); and invari-
ance (individuals should express the same preferences when different 
descriptions of the same outcome are presented). See Hanson & Kysar, supra 
note 28, at 64142.  
 36. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Mar-
kets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 
156 (2002) (discussing the case of Jonathan Lebed, a New Jersey teenager sub-
ject to an SEC enforcement action because of his postings on Internet chat-
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Rational investors have one purpose in choosing what to do 
with their investments: make more money.37 
Behavioral law and economics (BLE) undermines the ra-
tionality assumption by using data from psychological experi-
ments to radically alter our view of how humans make 
choices.38 BLE documents how individuals choice-making be-
havior systematically diverges from the predictions of the ra-
tional-actor model of human behavior.  
A second component of BLE research aims to develop and 
defend a theory of bounded self interest.39 Bounded self-
interest theory attempts to explain the attractiveness of norms 
of fairness, sharing, reciprocity, and altruism in ways distinct 
from those traditionally relied on by economists. 
BLE is a controversial discipline that has created an ever-
expanding literature debating its political40 and methodological 
 
boards). 
 37. The most common thick version of the rational choice theory is wealth 
maximization, which predicts that individuals will act to maximize the 
amount of money they have. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1066 (2000). 
 38.  See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 25 (2002) (discussing the effect of BLE on 
received wisdom of corporate law scholarship); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Man-
datory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1058 (2000) 
(For corporate and securities law scholars, behavioral economics probably is 
the most exciting intellectual development of the last decade.); Kent 
Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under 
Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (with Notes on Implications for 
Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 98485 (2003) (introduc-
ing experimental study aimed at undermining the traditional law and eco-
nomic view of the value of the profit-maximization norm); David A. Hoffman & 
Michael P. OShea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Princi-
pled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 36063 (2002) (describing how behavioral litera-
ture undermined classical law and economics normative research); cf. Lynn A. 
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Fi-
nance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 passim (2003) (discussing BLE implications for the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, supra note 28 (presenting a variety of essays on behavioral law 
and economics). 
 39. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
supra note 28, at 13, 16. 
 40. BLE has traditionally been seen as a politically liberal movement 
because it emboldens the use of government intervention to solve legal policy 
choices. See Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 38, at 1027 ([I]t 
seems probable that behavioral economics increasingly will be invoked by 
those who favor government intervention precisely because behavioral eco-
nomics offers a new line of argument in favor of regulating private conduct.); 
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roots.41 And, because I situate my scholarship firmly within the 
BLE camp, I am troubled by the perception that BLE re-
search has been manipulated to serve the ends of certain pri-
vate entities.42 
 
Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 94, 97 (2002) (explaining that economists on the left are more 
likely to embrace BLE than economists on the right). But cf. Colin Camerer 
et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 passim (2003) (articulating 
a theory of asymmetric paternalism which would protect irrational individu-
als while not harming rational ones). That paternalism serves a progressive 
agendabroadly conceivedis debatable. 
 41. Some argue that BLE experiments are flawed in design or execution. 
See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on 
the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOCY REV. 973 
passim (2000) (discussing problems of empirical research); Robert E. Scott, 
The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1603 passim (2000) (critiquing legal academics who use behavioral research to 
generalize from limited experimental data). The most prominent of these crit-
ics argues that some experiments seemed designed to elicit irrational re-
sponses, because of explicit or implicit cues to experimental subjects: 
Virtually all of the claims of the [BLE theorists are] . . . at most, lin-
guistic hedges, such as the data suggest some effect or some effect 
generally occurs, but not outright admissions that legal decision 
theory is founded on generalizations that are shakily inferred from 
aggregated data in between-subjects experiments. 
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pes-
simism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 
1969 (2002) (attacking the methodology of BLE). Robert Prentice responded 
that Mitchells claim amounts to an argument about details, as Mitchell ad-
mits that the rational-actor model does not in any way approximate[] how 
people actually act. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Fu-
ture of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1720 (2003) 
(defending BLE experiments against Mitchells withering attack). 
 42. In particular, authors have pointed to Exxons funding of jury experi-
ments (a crucial component of BLE research) and then using those experi-
ments in litigation. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric 
and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive Damages Judg-
ments in Hawaii, 19852001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 15153 (2004); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing 
Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129, 114749 
(2001); Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: 
Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 871 n.16 
(1999) ([I]t appears that Exxon is making a concerted effort to build a social 
science case for reducing or taking away the jurys discretion in awarding pu-
nitive damages and that the Hastie and Viscusi study is a part of this ef-
fort. . . . Indeed, Exxon has recently cited the above research in its appeal of 
the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez award.); Neil Vidmar, Juries Dont Make Legal 
Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Dam-
ages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713 (1999). For a theoretical account of how 
Exxons funding of BLE research might affect its conclusions, see Jon Hanson 
& David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
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But even if private parties are developing BLE to further 
their own ends, this does not substantially imperil BLEs core 
message. BLE is a critical empirical study driven by observa-
tions of indeterminacy and manipulability of individual choices 
in reaction to stimuli.43 Decision makers act under the influ-
ence of several cognitive biases and heuristics that distort their 
ability to rationally make decisions, each of which may push in 
a different direction. In the aggregate, it is difficult to predict 
what individuals will do.44 As significantly, individuals percep-
tions of risk (which, in the rational-actor model, exists inde-
pendently of the observer) turn out to be manipulable in prac-
tice, through the context and framing of the presentation of 
information or another stimulus.45 On this understanding of 
BLEs core message of manipulability, I embrace BLEs ex-
perimental data with an appropriate amount of caution, which 
I hope the reader will share.46 
In the securities context, the relationship between BLEs 
experimental findings and actual changes in stock price is no-
toriously complex. The argument goes that even if some inves-
tors act irrationally (e.g., trade based on noise instead of in-
formation), rational investors will profit, and stock prices will 
remain efficiently priced.47 This insight underlies the efficient 
 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
27279 (2003) (discussing the possible deep capture of legal academics by 
corporate funding). 
 43. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 28, at 722. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 72443. 
 46. A separate critique relates to BLEs need for a unifying theory. See, 
e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1057 (2000) (noting that the BLE 
movement lacks a single, coherent theory of behavior). According to Korob-
kin and Ulen, the goal of BLE ought to be to allow scholars to predict (with 
reasonable success) the responses of citizens to applicable legal rules. See id. 
at 1072. Thus, BLE need not articulate a theoretical model to compete with 
the rational-actor model, so long as its results are realistic. See id. at 107173; 
see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 28, at 689 ([A] complex model with real-
istic predictive capabilities is far preferable to a simplified model that bears 
little relationship to actual behavior.). Korobkin and Ulen analogize BLEs 
atheoretical core to the process of incomplete theorization in common law ad-
judication. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1073 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)). See generally SUNSTEIN, 
supra 3561. Curiously, legal economists have often resorted to the contention 
that the best is the enemy of the good. See, e.g., Hoffman & OShea, supra note 
38, at 34447 (criticizing the open-ended approach to moral and practical 
questions common in law and economics literature, and discussing the appli-
cation of Sunsteins theory of incompleteness to legal movements). 
 47. See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 14041. 
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capital market hypothesis (ECMH), which remains the only 
well-developed theory of stock market behavior.48 However, 
there is now a robust set of findings (described in behavioral fi-
nance literature) that important forms of human behavior are 
unlikely to be washed out in the financial markets.49 
The descriptive falsity of the ECMH is obviously important 
for any analysis of proper application of the materiality doc-
trine. Given that investors in the aggregate at least sometimes 
behave foolishly, materialitywhich asks what a reasonable 
investor will domay result in a divergence between what is 
commonplace or normal and what the law requires of inves-
tors.50 That is, even if markets efficiently price assets over the 
long term, a materiality analysis which ignores the insights of 
BLE threatens to disproportionately penalize individual inves-
tors, who (unlike institutions)51 are hopelessly disastrous deci-
sion-makers.52 
To make sense of BLEs application to the securities laws, 
the discussion below divides into three parts, corresponding to 
the three categorical ways that BLE undermines the contrac-
tarian thesis that still dominates academic discussion: Trouble 
with Probability, Trouble with Informational Processing, and 
Social Investing. I use this organization to make sense of the 
bewildering array of social science results. The purpose of this 
organization is not to suggest that individuals are necessarily 
subject to discrete and self-contained biases that each distort 
rationality, but rather to describe how BLE systematically 
undermines rationalitys major premises.  
A. TROUBLE WITH PROBABILITY 
Individuals are exceptionally poor at evaluating risk and 
uncertainty. This is old newsafter all, the multi-billion dollar, 
enormously profitable gambling industry depends on a certain 
amount of willful blindness to the reality of expected losses. 
But our trouble with risk extends beyond decisions to play 
 
 48. Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 109 (1999). 
 49. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 143; see also id. at 14052 (discussing 
the psychology of market price movements). 
 50. See Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 48, at 18386. 
 51. See, e.g., Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In Praise of Inves-
tor Irrationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 542, 
57074 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). 
 52. Id. at 546. 
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against the house.53 Rather, as this section explores, our ap-
proaches to risks and rewards are bafflingly inconsistent and 
often, in the aggregate, self-defeating. 
1. Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight bias is a dressed-up term for our belief in des-
tiny: that which has happened was likely to have happened all 
along.54 This bias follows from individuals consistent over-
statements of what they could have predicted after events 
have unfolded.55 Hindsight bias results from the common 
sense tendency of our brains to incorporate new information 
 
 53. Gambling may be thought of as rational because it is fun. But, pre-
sumably, whatever fun individuals achieve while losing money in a casino 
because they misjudge the odds of winning in craps is distinct from the experi-
ence of losing your life savings in the stock market because you are unable to 
assess the risk of an investment. This observation reduces to an intuition that 
while gambling is primarily experienced as an entertaining spectacle, capital 
investing is not. But see Alok Kumar, Who Gambles in the Stock Market? 26 
(EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper, 2005; AFA Boston Meetings Paper, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686022 (Poor, young, less educated men 
who live in urban, Republican dominated regions and belong to specific minor-
ity (African-American and Hispanic) and religious (Catholic) groups invest 
more in stocks with lottery-type features. Collectively, this evidence indicates 
that peoples attitudes toward gambling are reflected in their stock investment 
decisions.). 
 54. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 10951100 (describing the 
hindsight bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judg-
ing in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 28, at 95, 
9598 [hereinafter Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory] (describing 
cognitive and motivational factors creating the bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 
61, 6770 (2000) (describing early experiments that defined the bias and 
summarizing literature). In one example, two groups of individuals were con-
fronted with a problem involving a railroad accident. The first group was to 
assume that they were regulators and asked to determine whether a corpora-
tion should make repairs pursuant to regulation to avoid a railroad accident. 
Others were asked to assume they were jurors, after the accident had oc-
curred, and to determine the necessity of punitive damages. Thirty-three per-
cent of the regulators recommended the repairs, while (subject to hindsight 
bias) 67 percent of the jurors recommended punitive damages. See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 10008 (2002). The 
experimenters noted that the problem of hindsight bias is almost inevitable 
when jurors make punitive damages decisions. Id. at 108. 
 55. Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 774. In this important recent Article, 
the authors test two hypotheses that could explain why courts have advanced 
the theory of fraud by hindsight: to debias limitations on human judgment like 
hindsight bias; or, alternatively, to dispose of troublesome and complicated 
cases. They conclude that the latter hypothesis finds more support. See id. at 
824. 
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into existing information automatically.56 Indeed, some hy-
pothesize that the brain prefers simple inference strategies, 
that require little information . . . rather than complex strate-
gies that process lots of information.57 
To situate our understanding of how the hindsight bias 
might affect the capital markets, imagine that a corporation is 
considering at time T0 whether to disclose the existence of the 
risk of a strike that would close one of its factories and create a 
very modest downturn in profits. The risk of the strike at time 
T0 is minisculea contemporaneous email between managers 
puts the risk at one percent. Given the risk-discounted cost,58 
the corporation decides to hide the possibility of the strike from 
its investors. 
The strike occurs at time T1, with the expected, minor ef-
fect on profitability. The corporations stock price falls, and dis-
gruntled shareholders sue the corporation for failing to disclose 
the risk. 
A jury considering the corporations potential liability for 
this omission at T2, should not consider the strikes occurrence 
at T1 as important to the decision of an investor at T0.59 The fact 
that a later event transpires makes no difference to the in-
vestment decision at the time of disclosure, just as my hitting a 
red six while playing roulette does not make that number the 
smart choice before the fact. That is, if a reasonable investor 
means an investor who thinks without bias about risk, the le-
gal system would want to find a way to prevent plaintiffs from 
successfully asserting this kind of claim in a securities suit. 
BLE, however, seems to demonstrate that juries are sometimes 
unable to reject this kind of thinking: we are all subject to 
hindsight bias regarding materiality. The question then be-
comesas I address belowshould judges prohibit the hind-
sight inference by taking the case away from the jury by apply-
ing the doctrine of presumed immateriality?60 
 
 56. Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past 
Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 31114 
(1990). 
 57. Beth Azar, Blinded By Hindsight, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., May 2000, 
at 28, 29. 
 58. That is, the probability of loss times the magnitude of harm resulting 
from loss is small compared to the burden of disclosure (whether measured in 
incremental terms or even in lost negotiating leverage with the union). 
 59. See Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 78891. 
 60. A second question also arises: why judges would be any better than 
juries at avoiding the effects of hindsight. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, 
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2. Representativeness Heuristic 
BLE teaches that individuals also have a great deal of 
trouble shedding the effects of the representativeness heuris-
tic, a mental shortcut that leads us to judge things as similar 
based on relatively superficial (but representative) character-
istics.61 
A famous experiment demonstrating this effect presented 
subjects with a description of a woman with feminist charac-
teristics. Researchers then asked the subjects a relatively odd 
question: whether the woman was more likely to be (a) a bank 
teller or (b) a feminist bank teller. Although logically (a) must 
be more common than (b) because of base rateas there must 
be an equal or greater number of bank tellers than bank tellers 
that have opinions on gender politicsrespondents were un-
able to shed the effect of what they had already learned about 
the woman and 85 percent of them chose answer (b).62 
The representativeness heuristic appears to hold even 
when investors discover or have reason to know that informa-
tion is unreliable.63 Thus, despite facts suggesting fraud, inves-
tors will act on the representations of a broker whom they 
know (or have reason to know) has a motive to lie to them be-
cause that broker had previously demonstrated some character-
istics of a reliable source.64 Similarly, investors will trade on 
gossip from Internet chat rooms if the gossiping source displays 
some characteristics of being a corporate insider.65 Needless to 
say, academics have questioned whether rational investors 





and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 passim 
(2001) (discussing problems judges have in evaluating risk). 
 61. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Repre-
sentativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
84, 84 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see also Hanson & Kysar, supra 
note 28, at 66467 (discussing the representiveness heuristic). 
 62. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 61, at 9293. 
 63. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A 
Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEU-
RISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 61, at 32, 3233. 
 64. See Prentice, supra note 41, at 36869. 
 65. Such characteristics include purported knowledge of corporate trivia 
or inside baseball discussions of politics within the company. 
 66. See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 157. 
HOFFMAN_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:02:57 PM 
2006] DUTY TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER 553 
 
To illustrate how this heuristic works in the capital mar-
kets, suppose a broker tells a shareholder to invest in a particu-
lar stock. The shareholder has had experiences with that bro-
ker and believes him to be a truthful, upstanding professional. 
Along with his recommendation, the broker passes her a pro-
spectus containing written warnings about the stocks perform-
ance, together with financials that cast doubt on the brokers 
representations. 
Economically rational investors should pass on the recom-
mendation. However, the representative heuristic suggests that 
most investors will invest based on their previous dealings with 
the broker, despite reading the written warnings, because they 
are unable to shed old illusions in the face of contrary new in-
formation. 
3. Risk Tolerance 
Individuals are risk seeking in avoiding current losses.67 
Loss aversion is a common and depressingly familiar phenome-
non. We hold under water stocks for longer that we ought, in 
the hope of reversing the tide.68 Readers who do not participate 
in the stock market may be familiar with the phenomenon in 
other settings: deciding to press your luck by returning to the 
ATM machine when down while gambling; being unable to 
imagine (that is, being unwilling to confront the risk of) 
unlikely future catastrophic losses; or refusing to sell your 
house for years longer than necessary in the hope of eventually 
getting your money back.69 
BLE tells us a different story with respect to gains: indi-
viduals are risk averse when confronting a choice between cer-
tain property and potential gains. Thus, while a rational  
 
 
 67. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 41, at 364; see also Terrance Odean, 
Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average, 53 
J. FIN. 1887, 189697 (1998) (discussing the tendency of individual investors 
to buy the same number of winning and losing stocks but to sell winning 
stocks at a higher rate). 
 68. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 13. 
 69. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The 
Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1301 
(1993) (explaining that customers rarely consider subsequent legal action 
when contracting). An interesting corollary to this principle is that individu-
als, because they discount the likelihood of future losses, will be less sensitive 
to warnings about such losses. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 12 (dis-
cussing the availability heuristic); Prentice, supra note 41, at 364. 
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shareholder would be equally happy to accept either a dividend 
stream with a present value of $100 or a potential rise in stock 
resulting in present value gains of either 0 or $200, real indi-
viduals actually prefer the certain gain.70 
Loss aversion may be related to the endowment effect.71 
The endowment effect describes the higher value we place on 
things we own than on those we do not. The classic experiment 
involves coffee mugs. Experimenters gave a group of experi-
mental subjects (the buyers) money; a second group (the sell-
ers) plain coffee mugs.72 Experiments asked the sellers to 
name the minimum price they would demand to sell their mugs 
and the buyers the maximum they would pay. Both groups 
were told that if market prices were established, trades would 
occur. But when the results were in, no trades were possible 
because the buyers were willing to pay, on average, only half 
the amount demanded by the sellers who owned the mugs.73 
This result contravenes one predicted by the rational choice 
modelthat both groups will value the mugs identically.74 
To appreciate the interaction of these principles, imagine a 
few disclosures by a corporation that has recently had a run of 
very bad luck. It states that things are looking up, that we 
have no reason to expect that current bad trends will continue, 
and the future is bright. While rational shareholders would 
ignore such meaningless boasts, real shareholders might not 
because they are subject to loss aversion. By contrast, share-
holders whose holdings have recently appreciated may overre-
act to relatively innocuous earnings warnings, seeking to take 
sure gains instead of facing the risk of losing them. 
 
 70. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litiga-
tion, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 11828 (1996). I assume away the tax implica-
tions of the choice. 
 71. Also, as some have noted, there may be times when the principle of 
loss aversion and the endowment effect are in tension with each other (in a 
sharply falling market, for example, the endowment effect would counsel re-
taining stocks while the need to avoid losses would suggest selling). See Han-
son & Kysar, supra note 28, at 689. 
 72. There was no coffee in the mugs. Had there been, one might fairly un-
derstand the result of the experiment given the expected utility accompanying 
a full cup of coffee. 
 73. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 passim (1990) (exploring 
the endowment effect). 
 74. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1108 n.235. 
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4. Overconfidence 
Have you ever, in the privacy of your home, made one of 
the following statements: I am a better driver,75 cook, and/or 
dancer than average?76 Join the club. Most citizens (90 percent 
of drivers) believe they possess better skills than average.77 
Similarly, most investors mistakenly believe they can beat the 
market.78 BLE research teaches that investors believe that 
good things are more likely than average to happen to [their 
stock] and bad things are less likely than average to happen to 
[it].79 
Investors put too much weight on privately acquired in-
formation and are unable to fairly judge their ability to exceed 
the market.80 A classic example of investor overconfidence is 
the prevalence of so-called day traders in the late-1990s mar-
ket bubble.81 These traders were known for their short patience 
with holding stock and high trading volume. Day traders, dis-
proportionately young men, achieved notoriously low returns 
relative to the broader market indexes.82 
Illustrating investor overconfidence in the securities fraud 
context is easy. Assume that every corporation in a segment of 
the farming industry announces a possible Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) investigation into a price-fixing conspiracy 
 
 75. But I am! 
 76. In the face of persuasive anecdotal (or statistical) evidence to the con-
trary. 
 77. Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 913, 929 (2000). 
 78. See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 14648. 
 79. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1091; see Peter H. Huang, Trust, 
Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 passim (2003) (dis-
cussing the mechanism by which broker behavior may be internally regulated 
through emotions); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. 
L. REV. 407, 42026 (2002) (discussing investor overconfidence as a function of 
trust). 
 80. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 146. 
 81. See Denis J. Hilton, Psychology and the Financial Markets: Applica-
tions to Understanding and Remedying Irrational Decision-Making, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS VOLUME I: RATIONALITY AND WELL BE-
ING 273, 27577 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (discussing 
day trading and investor overconfidence generally); Choi & Pritchard, supra 
note 26, at 12; Ravi Dhar & William N. Goetzmann, Bubble Investors: What 
Were They Thinking 14 (Yale Intl Center for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-01, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=683366 (finding that an over-
whelming majority of surveyed investors were confident that they would be 
able to pick undervalued stocks based on public information). 
 82. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 12. 
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on the same day. Each company makes disclosures which pro-
claim its innocence. An investor holds stock in GiantFarm Cor-
poration, one of the companies named by the FTC, and must 
decide whether to sell her stock. Overoptimism leads to the fol-
lowing internal conversation: As good things are more likely to 
happen to me and the corporations I own than to others and the 
corporations they own, GiantFarm will be less crooked than 
others in the farming industry. I will hold on to my stock for a 
while yet. 
5. Experiential Thinking 
These problems with risk analysis appear to occur without 
a unifying theme. However, they may be harmonized when we 
consider the emotional content of risk perception. Individuals 
make decisions through two distinct methods: a rational sys-
tem and an emotionally driven experiential system.83 Deci-
sions made under the former system are logical, deliberate, 
and abstract.84 
Because the rational system is so complex, and demands 
cognitive resources from other tasks, individuals typically 
rely on a more emotional method associated with intuitive 
judgments, emotional responses, and other subtle, noncon-
scious reactions to external stimuli.85 Using experiential 
thinking, individuals process risk using an affect consisting 
of that individuals preexisting emotional construct.86 
For example, a feeling of dread may be associated with 
certain technologies like genetic manipulation, and individuals 
related perceptions of risks are accordingly increased.87 On the 
other hand, if individuals have a preexisting, positive emotional 
feeling about a technology (such as miniature computers), then 
the risks associated with further developments in that techno-
logical area may be perceived to be smaller than they really are 
(e.g., the risks of nanotechnology). The affect associated with 
risk judgment is strongly influenced by demographic factors.88 
Risk perception also is culturally dependant.89 
 
 
 83. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 28, at 669. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 66970. 
 87. Id. at 670; see also Hilton, supra note 81, at 284 (comparing studies). 
 88. See infra note 238. 
 89. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK xxxiii (2000). 
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Thus, when a corporation discloses a risk, individuals may 
perceive it as either vastly more important than it objectively 
is or much less important depending on its accompanying af-
fect.90 Individual shareholders are bad scientists. Risks that 
may seem trivial to courts in the cold light of day can be ac-
companied by a large emotional burden for shareholders at the 
time of disclosure.91 
In sum, BLE experiments suggest that individuals experi-
ence risk and risk-shifting decisions in unpredictable ways. The 
principles of risk management (identifying constant risks and 
costs and trading them off) appear to be applied inconsistently, 
especially when risks are perceived through emotional lenses. 
Legal doctrine which demands strict adherence to probability 
theory therefore risks punishing quite ordinary, but irra-
tional, behaviors. 
B. TROUBLE WITH INFORMATION PROCESSING 
A second category of BLE research deals with individuals 
inabilities to process information in rational ways. This re-
search questions how humans try to differentiate relevant from 
irrelevant information and prioritize what to focus on. Some 
examples follow. 
1. Source Blindness 
BLE research discloses that even when individuals are 
convinced of the veracity of contrary information, they change 
their views slowly in the face of persuasive evidence; that is, 
new information is processed against the background of what 
came before.92 
Investors are particularly likely to believe analyst reports 
when those reports are affected by the representativeness heu-
ristic.93 However, where investors look at analyst reports ab-
sent a personal connection with the broker, they are still un-
able to discount the potential biases and ignorance of the 
analysts, despite evidence that analysts are quite conflicted.94 
 
 90. A third option, that emotional affect has no corresponding effect, is 
also plausible. 
 91. The Supreme Court has applied this insight elsewhere. See Brown v. 
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (cautioning that [d]etached reflection 
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife). 
 92. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 14445. 
 93. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 94. See Hilton, supra note 81, at 278 (discounting the accuracy of expert 
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Because of this evidence, scholars often assert that reliance on 
analyst reports is irrational.95 
A related kind of source blindness appears when individu-
als consistently overvalue the importance of oral information.96 
We believe what we hear, not what we read. Investors who 
learn about a stock through a report on television may be more 
influenced to buy or sell than those who merely read a prospec-
tus.97 Similarly, investors who listen to analyst calls will be 
affected disproportionately: oral representations have signifi-
cantly more persuasive impact than written disclaimers.98 
2. The Framing Effect 
Perceptions of risks and benefits are subject to manipula-
tion by corporations because of the existence of the so-called 
framing effect. A classic experiment with respect to framing 
presented subjects with a very hard problem: they were asked 
to select between treatment programs for a disease otherwise 
marked by a 100 percent mortality rate (with a 600-person in-
fected population).99 There were four programs: 
• Program A: 200 people will be saved. 
• Program B: 33.3 percent chance that the entire population 
will be saved; 66.6 percent chance that none of the popula-
tion will be saved.100 
• Program C: 400 people will die. 
• Program D: 33.3 percent chance that none of the population 
will die; 66.6 percent chance that the entire population will 
die. 
 
predictions); Nowicki, supra note 20, at 1327. 
 95. John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 
2001, at 5 (examining liability for patently silly investment advice); Nowicki, 
supra note 20, at 1327 (discussing market reaction to analyst reports). But cf. 
Dhar & Goetzmann, supra note 81, at tbl.B-3 (showing that individual re-
search and a recommendation from a broker were the two most important fac-
tors in the decision to purchase a security); id. at tbl.B-14 (showing that most 
surveyed individuals believed that brokers are somewhat likely to be able to 
identify poorly priced securities). 
 96. Prentice, supra note 41, at 34849, 36971. 
 97. STEVEN R. DROZDECK & KARL F. GRETZ, THE BROKERS EDGE: HOW TO 
SELL SECURITIES IN ANY MARKET 222 (1995) (suggesting that a letter delivers 
7 percent of the message conveyed in a face-to-face presentation). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984). 
 100. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing 
of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. §§ 251, 255 (1986). 
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Rational actors, seeking to maximize lives saved, would be 
indifferent between these choices, as they result in the same 
predicted outcome: 200 lives saved, 400 lives lost.101 However, 
when one group of subjects was asked to choose between pro-
grams A and B, 72 percent chose A. When a second group was 
asked to choose between C and D, 78 percent chose D.102 Why 
does one group prefer uncertainty while the other does not? Be-
cause of framing effects. A is preferable to B because it guar-
antees lives saved (recall the preference for guaranteed gains). 
C is less attractive than D because it guarantees lives lost (re-
call the risk-seeking preferences of individuals to avoid future 
losses).103  
Some researchers suggest that a cognitive-affective trade-
off produces the framing effect.104 Experiments have shown 
that a person expends less cognitive effort when choosing a 
guaranteed gain than when selecting a risky gain.105 Conse-
quently, some prefer a guaranteed gain over a risky one.106 Pos-
sibly, decision makers seek to avoid the cognitive cost involved 
in evaluating a gain and the emotions involved in imagining an 
uncertain reward.107 On the other hand, a person expends an 
equal amount of cognitive effort when selecting a guaranteed 
loss as she does when selecting a risky loss.108 This suggests 
why we might seek risks in the face of losses. 
Frames are quite significant when thinking about corpo-
rate disclosure in the securities fraud context.109 Information 
about losses will be discounted if framed as a mere future prob-
 
 101. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 28, at 644. 
 102. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 99, at 343. 
 103. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 28, at 64445. In another experiment, 
employees were presented with two retirement funds with different risk pro-
files: bonds (relatively safe) and stocks (relatively risky). The employees were 
shown the historical data on the returns of each fund and thus should have 
been able to confirm the expected outcomes and risk profiles. However, the 
data was framed differently. One group of employees only received one-year 
returns; the other group was shown a simulated thirty-year distribution. Al-
most all the employees seeing the longer distribution invested in the more 
risky fund and vice versa. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 4344. 
 104. Cleotilde Gonzales et al., The Framing Effect and Risky Decisions: Ex-
amining Cognitive Functions with fMRI, 26 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2005). 
 105. Id. at 13. 
 106. Id. at 15. 
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. Id. at 13. 
 109. See, e.g., Hilton, supra note 81, at 28893 (discussing potential appli-
cations of psychology to financial products marketing). 
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ability; information about gains will be overemphasized when 
presented as a certain near term result.110 Thus, corporations 
are rewarded by the market for engaging in accounting tech-
niques that maximize short-term gains.111 
3. Information Overload 
Classical theory asserts that rational shareholders are pre-
sumptively able to evaluate the thousandth page in a prospec-
tus just as well as the first. However, BLE experimental results 
teach us that as a decision maker is given more information, 
decision quality increases up to a point, but eventually de-
clines.112 
This result is predicted by the theory of bounded rational-
ity: rationality bounded on the one hand by the context and 
content of the task we are facing and on the other, by our own 
cognitive limitations.113 As a result of information overload, 
shareholders may rely on heuristics to make better decisions, 
such as choosing a fund based on its managers instead of its 
fundamentals.114 
Taken together, evidence of distortion in the ways that 
humans process information suggests problems for areas of law 
like securities and contract which depend heavily on the as-
sumption that individuals understand and fully appreciate 
every word found on written documents. 
C. SOCIAL INVESTING 
Thus far, I have discussed investing and irrational inves-
tors as if they acted in a vacuum, making bad decisions from 
the comfort of their studies, isolated from other people. But, 
 
 110. See Henry T.C. Hu, Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of 
Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 38586 (1997). 
 111. See id. 
 112. Paredes, supra note 32, at 441. But see David M. Grether, Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An 
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 285 (1986) (arguing 
that information overload is irrelevant because people adopt simplified deci-
sion-making procedures to cope with increased information); Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 37, at 1078 (describing experiments where subjects were less likely 
to maximize their utility when purchasing a house as the number of its attrib-
utes increased beyond ten). 
 113. Paredes, supra note 32, at 435. 
 114. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 1314 (noting that such a heuris-
tic may be rational as managing underwriters with more experience might be 
better at avoiding fraud). 
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this picture of investing is highly unrealistic. Investors run in 
herds. 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge puts it starkly: What ex-
plains fads like Beanie Babies and Pokemon?115 This question 
can be answered, in part, by analyzing investor herd behav-
ior, whereby each investor devolves to another the decision to 
invest in the market, resulting in stampedes as market follow-
ers follow market leaders.116 
There is evidence of herd behavior in capital markets: in-
vestors following others into popular portfolios, conventional 
stocks, and suboptimal bond issues.117 However, the actual 
mechanism for such movement is quite obscure.118 There is also 
evidence that herd behavior decreases as market sophistication 
increases.119 As some scholars have noted, the prevalence of 
herd behavior may be explained in terms of network external-
itiessome products and stocks become more valuable as more 
people use them. The common example is a personal com-
puter,120 but a more relevant example for readers may be the 
BAR/BRI exam review course.121 
Some explain the case of Jonathan Lebed, a New Jersey 
teenager who allegedly bought stock in small companies and 
then hyped those companies on the Internet, as a story of herd 
 
 115. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 103738. 
 116. Prentice, supra note 41, at 373. 
 117. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1038; see also Dhar & Goetzmann, supra 
note 81, at 16 (discussing phenomena of investors purchasing assets that they 
already believed were overvalued on the theory that it would continue to be 
inefficiently priced). 
 118. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 159. 
 119. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 103940 (indicating that investor herd-
ing occurs more frequently in emerging markets than in developed capital 
markets); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role 
of Securities Regulation 5, 1617 (Columbia Law and Economics, Working Pa-
per No. 259, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600709 (arguing that 
one group of market participants, noise traders, defined as participants who 
act irrationally, falsely believing that they possess some valuable informa-
tional advantage or superior trading skills, engage in herd behavior and are 
competitively disadvantaged vis-à-vis more sophisticated investors). 
 120. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 104041. 
 121. That is, as more students use BAR/BRI, its usefulness in helping stu-
dents pass the Bar, a curved exam, increases. The reason is that if the major-
ity of studentsall coached alike by BAR/BRIbelieve that X is the answer to 
a given question (when it is not) failure to know that answer will not hurt a 
students chances to pass. The interesting thing about this claim is that it 
proves too much: if all students took BAR/BRI, the BAR/BRI-effect would dis-
appear. 
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behavior.122 The SEC prosecuted Lebed on the theory that 
shareholders had relied on his false hype in purchasing shares, 
but reached a settlement.123 Is this an example of individual 
investors following others in investing in penny stocks without 
thought? Perhaps so, but it also demonstrates the pernicious 
effects of the representativeness heuristic and source blindness, 
as explained above. 
In sum, BLE teaches that individual investors are unlikely 
to respond rationally to corporate disclosures: their behavior 
depends heavily on the context and presentation of disclosures. 
We should not blindly follow the herd in overgeneralizing 
from the evidence of unpredictable, foolish, and illogical deci-
sion making presented above. Not all investors consistently fail 
to wealth maximize; not every trader privileges oral over writ-
ten disclosures. Although there is evidence that markets are 
distorted by irrationality,124 not all people are fooled all the 
time by disclosures which prey on information processing bi-
ases. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence of the serious-
ness of the problem to form a hypothesis: legal regimes which 
evaluate investing decisions in the cold light of hindsight and 
which privilege only wealth-maximizing decisions are likely to 
discriminate against large segments of the investing public. 
In the next two sections, I ask whether materiality doctrine 
in the United States is one such legal regime. 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERIALITY 
The materiality element in securities law requires the de-
cision maker to reach conclusions about the way investors be-
have in response to corporate action. The reasonable part of 
the standards definition suggests that the decision maker need 
not be a jury, because some behaviors will be so unreasonable 
as to be resolvable as a matter of law. Materiality, then, creates 
a need for courts to articulate and defend a series of commit-
ments and assumptions about how investors act. 
My thesis is that courts, in analyzing securities law, gener-
ally adhere to the foundational assumption of corporate law: 
 
 122. See generally Richard Walker & David Levine, Youve Got Jail: Cur-
rent Trends in Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405, 40715 (2001) (providing an extensive discussion of the 
Lebed case). 
 123. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 156. 
 124. Id. at 14151. 
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investors act rationally.125 Presumed immateriality functions 
as a channeling doctrine to exclude from the universe of meri-
torious cases those in which plaintiffs behavior, if proven, 
would be different from the behavior predicted by the rational 
investor model. But as I just discussed, BLE teaches us that 
individuals do not process disclosures rationally. Courts equa-
tion of reasonableness with rationality is a normative move. It 
transforms materiality from a requirement that reflects ordi-
nary behavior to one that may instead sanction it. 
It bears reemphasizing that conventional wisdom makes 
materiality out to be a relative backwater of securities law doc-
trine, as most commentators still hold that it is rare for a court 
to dismiss claims as presumptively immaterial. For many rea-
sons (among them, the attribution and information processing 
biases discussed above), reading illustrative cases and com-
menting on themthe ordinary form of legal scholarshipis 
likely to be particularly deceptive in the materiality arena. To 
get a better picture of what materiality doctrine looks like in 
the real world, then, I set out to perform statistical testing on a 
large sample of federal securities law applying the reasonable 
shareholder standard over the past thirty years126 after the 
Supreme Court decided TSC Industries.127 Because the number 
of cases was overwhelmingly large, I limited my analysis to 
cases arising in the Second Circuit and its district courts.128 
There were 472 opinions in the resulting data set. In 87 
cases, there was no discernable holding that any disclosure was 
material, possibly material, or immaterial.129 I excluded those 
cases and coded the remaining 385 cases.131 It is important to 
note that this dataset is not necessarily representative of all 
court action on materiality: sampling error may have skewed 
my results.132 Thus, my results are a preliminary look at how 
materiality has evolved in judicial opinions, and may only 
loosely reflect what courts are doing in the world at large. 
 
 
 125. See supra notes 3237 and accompanying text. 
 126. My search terminated in November 2004. 
 127. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44849 (1976) 
(adopting a rule for 14a-9 proxy actions). 
 128. See infra App., at 60809. 
 129. See infra App., at 609. 
 131. See infra App., at 60910. 
 132. See infra App., at 61011. 
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In the following sections of the Article, I identify hypothe-
ses that follow from common perceptions about immateriality, 
the securities laws, and the way those laws are implemented in 
the judicial system. After identifying each hypothesis, I evalu-
ate it against the data I have collected. 
 
A. PRESUMED IMMATERIALITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME AND 
IDEOLOGY 
1. Hypothesis A.1: Presumed Immateriality Will Appear 
Rarely in the Published Opinions 
Most courts and commentators agree that presumptive 
immateriality is an infrequently applied doctrine, relying on 
the same universe of published opinions collected here.133 We 
should therefore expect that if the conventional wisdom is cor-
rect, relatively few cases, as a percentage of the total, will pre-
sume immateriality. Using a relatively arbitrary test, I assume 
that the references to rarity in previous discussions mean that 
presumed immateriality should appear in less than 10 percent 
of decisions. 
Result: False. As the reader can see from Figure 1, a strik-
ingly high percentage of the opinions I coded dismissed at least 
one claim as presumptively immaterial. An average of 44 per-
cent of cases contained such a finding. 
Figure 1: Percent of Cases Finding At 
 Least One Claim Presumptively Immaterial 
 
 133. See sources cited supra note 21. 
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This descriptive result, standing alone, tells us surpris-
ingly little about the nature of presumed immateriality doc-
trine. However, it does undermine the conventional wisdom, 
showing that judges in published opinions are more willing to 
dismiss disclosures as immaterial than previously thought. 
2. Hypothesis A.2: Presumed Immateriality Will Vary  
With the Changes in the Related Securities Law Doctrines 
It makes good sense that judges have applied the pre-
sumed materiality doctrine at different rates over time. There 
are several ways such an intuition might play out. 
The conservative judges hypothesis. Judges may be re-
flecting and encouraging a general pro-defendant bias result-
ing from a shift in the personnel on the federal courts.134 This 
hypothesis predicts a general upward trend in presumptive 
immateriality doctrine over time. 
The activity level hypothesis. According to the Supreme 
Court, one of the purposes of presumptive immateriality is to 
set appropriate corporate disclosure activity levels: too much 
activity disclosure by corporations burdens business without a 
corresponding increased benefit to individuals.135 Higher rates 
of presumed immateriality reduce disclosure pressures.136 One 
possible consequence is that as corporations face more pressure 
to disclose because of other changes in securities laws, the 
prevalence of presumptive materiality should increase as 
judges attempt to smooth out the effects of the law and pre-
vent overdisclosure.137 
 
 134. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 31618 (indicating that both judges per-
sonal experiences as investors and their responsibility to assess investors be-
havior in hindsight tend to favor defendants). While that trend may be appar-
ent nationwide, the composition of the judges of the Second Circuit and its 
district courts has remained relatively stable. In 1976, of 66 judges sitting on 
the courts that made up my sample, 39 (or 59 percent) were appointed by Re-
publican Presidents. In 2004, of 110 judges, 63 (or 57 percent) were appointed 
by Republican Presidents. See Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal 
Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (follow Judges of the United 
States Courts hyperlink; then follow Federal Judges Biographical Database 
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). 
 135. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44849 (1976) 
(explaining that too much disclosure will result in corporations bury[ing] the 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial informationa result that is hardly 
conducive to informed decision-making). 
 136. This is so especially in omission cases, where courts would be more 
likely to find that fraud by omission was immaterial. 
 137. See Roussel, supra note 22, at 104955 (arguing that courts developed 
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To test these hypotheses, I have broken up the period un-
der scrutiny into four subparts, displayed in Figure 2. The first, 
from 1976 through 1988, represents the baseline. The second, 
from 1989 through 1995, follows the expansion and reaffirma-
tion of materiality in Basic v. Levinson138 and the rise in filings 
of securities fraud lawsuits. The third, from 1996 through 2000, 
represents the period following the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act (PSLRA), which was intended to make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in securities fraud cases and, 
thus, would have the effect of reducing disclosure pressures on 
corporations.139 The fourth, from 2001 through 2004, is roughly 
coterminous with the fall of Enron, the passage of Sarbanes Ox-
ley,140 and a legal environment which presumably increased the 
baseline pressure to disclose. 
Results: No Effect Found. Figure 2 is deceiving. Although 
descriptive, it appears that the last few years have witnessed a 
decline in presumed immateriality after a period of relatively 
stability. I found no statistically significant changes in courts 
application of the doctrine over time.141 That is, although 
changes in courts applications of presumed immateriality may 
be practically important, we cannot attribute them to factors 





doctrines of presumed immateriality to fill the gap before Congress passed the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). Judges may see the materi-
ality decision as a proxy for societys tolerance of enforcement of the securities 
laws allowing more cases to pass materiality scrutiny in times when they per-
ceive the securities laws to be more popular. This intuition would lead to re-
sults contrary to the activity level hypothesis. 
 138. 485 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 139. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). 
PSLRA was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from filing suits intended to extract 
settlements from issuers and made a series of technical changes to the law. Id. 
 140. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78jo (Supp. II 2002)). 
 141. I performed an analysis of variance test, where a finding of presumed 
immateriality was the dependent variable. I failed to find a significant rela-
tionship (p=.49). The p-values are the probability of observing any outcome as 
extreme or more extreme than the observed outcomes. Krawiec & Zeiler, su-
pra note 8, at 54 n.149. P-values below 5 percent are traditionally required to 
create statistical significance. Id. 
 142. For a lucid discussion of the difference between practical and statisti-
cal significance, see DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS 
OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 14344 (1983). 
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Figure 2: Presumed Immateriality Over Time 
It is dangerous to make too much of this result. That the 
doctrine has been applied in a relatively stable manner in the 
dataset does not mean, for example, that judges have been uni-
formly hostile to securities law cases. There are reasons to con-
clude that securities fraud plaintiffs have become more sophis-
ticated over time.143 If true, such plaintiffs would bring 
stronger lawsuits in the present than in the past; a stable ap-
plication of materiality may be the result of increased judicial 
scrutiny of stronger cases. Given this caveat, it is still striking 
that neither of the two results predicted by a commonly ac-
cepted set of assumptions about judges behavior with respect 
to materiality (that the doctrine would be more common in the 
present than the past, and that it would vary internally over 
time) were supported in the dataset I collected. 
B.  PRESUMED IMMATERIALITY AS A FUNCTION OF CASE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Hypothesis B.1: Presumed Immateriality Decisions Will Be 
Relatively Insensitive to Party Identity 
The assumptions of the corporate activity hypothesis lead 
to a second prediction: the decision to dismiss claims on mate-
riality grounds should be insensitive to plaintiff identity. If the 
goal of materiality is to regulate the appropriate amount of cor-
porate disclosure, plaintiff identity should only matter to the 
extent that materiality contains a subjective component, which 
it does not. Therefore, to take an example, suits by the SEC 
 
 143. For example, some have argued that law firms consolidated after the 
PSLRA. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action 
Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (discussing growth in 
class action firms). This consolidation might have led to a more uniform and 
sophisticated set of disclosures being brought to the courthouse door. 
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should, presumably, succeed or fail on materiality grounds at 
the same rate as suits by private plaintiffs.144 
Results: Not Proven. Following a regression analysis, I de-
termined that plaintiff identity (SEC or not) had a statistically 
significant effect on presumed immateriality.145 Figure 3 de-
scribes the effect. 
 
 
Figure 3: Plaintiff Characteristics and Presumed Immateriality 
 
Cases Brought by the United States 
 
 
 144.  I am not hypothesizing that private plaintiffs overall success rate is 
close to the federal government. I hypothesize only that on this one limited is-
sue, there is no good reason to believe that a differential would exist. 
 145. p<.001. Note that this analysis, because it applies a logit regression 
analysis, uses the reduced database of 348 cases obtained when I removed 
cases that appeared repeatedly in the dataset. See App., at 608. 
Cases Brought By Private Plaintiffs 
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Based on this result, I reject the hypothesis that plaintiff 
identity does not matter to the materiality decision. At least  
with respect to the governments presence in the reported opin-
ions, it matters a great deal. 
Notably, a finding that plaintiff identity matters does not 
itself disprove the corporate activity hypothesis. Different 
plaintiffs may choose to bring different kinds of lawsuits, and to 
prosecute them in different ways, meaning that the materiality 
decisions are not really comparable. Thus, some of the federal 
governments success may arise from better screening of the 
kinds of cases the government brings, and better lawyering 
throughout the process.146 Another possibility, which would 
tend to undermine the corporate activity materiality hypothesis 
is that courts give more deference to some plaintiffs than oth-
ers. Further testing of this effect, such as looking at the differ-
ences between institutional and individual investors, would no 
doubt prove valuable in evaluating competing explanations for 
the data. 
2. Hypothesis B.2: Presumed Immateriality Increases in 
Frequency Later in the Life of Lawsuits 
 A third natural consequence of the corporate activity hy-
pothesis is that, if true, it would predict that presumed imma-
teriality would be sensitive to procedure. To change activity 
levels accurately, courts ought to let plaintiffs allegations of re-
liance on false disclosures proceed to trial unless persuasive 
evidence is submitted to the contrary.147 Therefore, there 
 
 146. Cf. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, Federal Agency Focus: the Depart-
ment of Justice: The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies 
Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2000) (DOJs status is justified on 
the grounds that a single, highly talented law firm will ensure quality repre-
sentation, consistency, [and] efficiency . . . .); Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed 
Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Adminis-
trative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 65865 (2004) (discussing the practice 
of judicial deference to agencies). For this claim to explain all of the differ-
ences I observed in government and civil success rates, we would have to as-
sume that civil plaintiffs benefit by bringing claims that fail around half the 
time. This claim, in turn, relies on a presumption about civil lawyers belief 
that it is relatively costless to add frivolous claims in otherwise meritorious 
suits. As Krawiec and Zeiler observe, where plaintiffs intermingle a few strong 
claims with a number of weaker claims based on the same fact pattern (as in 
most securities fraud cases), the marginal cost of adding an additional weak 
claim to the suit is essentially zero. Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 8, at 87. 
 147. Overuse of presumed immateriality results in insufficient enforcement 
and, therefore, underdisclosure; underuse of presumed immateriality has the 
opposite effect. 
HOFFMAN_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:02:57 PM 
570 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:537 
 
should be a relatively smaller likelihood of finding presumed 
immateriality earlier in the life of a lawsuiti.e., fewer such 
decisions on motions to dismiss and more decisions on motions 
for summary judgment.148 
Results: No Effect Found. Figure 4 contains a descriptive 
look at the dataset, which illustrates the powerful pruning 












 148. There should be a higher rate of findings of presumed immateriality at 
the appellate level than at the district court level for two additional reasons. 
First, many have suggested that increased attention to securities claims 
should result in lower win percentages for plaintiffs as judges carefully sort 
through the kinds of claims that are and are not actionable. In a sense, this is 
the theory of PSLRA. See generally Joseph T. Phillips, A New Pleading Stan-
dard Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 
969, 972 (2001) (stating that Congress intended to create a heightened plead-
ing standard for private lawsuits). Second, given that district courts are bound 
by appellate courts, and appellate courts frequently caution district courts not 
to make findings of presumed immateriality, there should be, as a rule, more 
findings of presumed immateriality at the appellate level. 
 149. Coding for summary judgment includes motions for judgment on the 
pleadings. Motion to Dismiss includes a limited set of other pre-answer 
pleadings: motions to transfer, motions to remand, and motions for a more 
definite statement. 
HOFFMAN_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:02:57 PM 
2006] DUTY TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER 571 
 
Regression of these variables against immateriality failed 
to find statistical significance.150 Descriptively, Table 1 tells the 
story. 
 
Table 1: Effect of Procedure on Presumed Immateriality 
 
Procedural Stage Percentage of Cases Finding 
One Claim Immaterial 
Motion to Dismiss 47.6% 
Summary Judgment 35.9% 
Injunctive Relief 43.9% 
Post-Trial Motion 34.1% 
Appeal 53.1% 
 
Again, these differences do not represent statistically sig-
nificant changes in the dependant variable: I failed to find sup-
port for the corporate activity/procedural sensitivity hypothesis. 
One explanation for this result is that suggested by the Priest-
Klein Hypothesis, which predicts that because only close cases 
will be brought to litigation (others being settled before suit) 
the formal structure of the law [will] appear indeterminate to 
any scientific, empirical method of observing judicial deci-
sions.151 My results suggest that further testing with a focus 
on whether courts are granting motions to dismiss with unex-
pected regularity, would be quite useful.152 
 
 150. The following are the p-values resulting from a logit regression, using 
the reduced database. Motion to Dismiss=.77; Summary Judgment=.32; In-
junction=.99; Post-Trial=.64; Appeal=.73. 
 151. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti-
gation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1984) (citing George L. Priest, Selective Char-
acteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410 (1980)) (predicting that 
only close cases will be brought to litigation, whereas others will be settled be-
fore suit). I, like Krawiec and Zeiler, am doubtful about the predictive value of 
this theory in the context of analyzing one element in a larger claim. Krawiec 
& Zeiler, supra note 8, at 87. An alternative explanation for the lack of proce-
dural bite in securities cases would rely on the insight that the materiality 
analysis usually turns on the application of law to relatively uncontested 
factse.g., that a corporation made a disclosure on a given day. This is obvi-
ously less true where a defendant relies on material outside of the pleadings
e.g., a truth-on-the-market defense. 
 152. One way that the settlement effect could play out is that cases later in 
the life of a lawsuit are relatively more likely to be weaker because stronger 
cases will settle earlier. But this seems to be too simple an analysis. There are 
many factors influencing the likelihood of settlement: the amount at stake, the 
plaintiffs counsel resources, the defendants resources, the involvement of the 
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3. Hypothesis B.3: As Plaintiffs Bring More Claims, It Will 
Become More Likely That at Least One Will Be Dismissed 
This hypothesis represents a kind of truth check on the da-
tabase. Plaintiffs bringing more claims should, all other things 
being equal, be more likely to have one such claim dismissed as 
presumptively immaterial. A negative result in testing this hy-
pothesis would presumably mean that other factors, which I did 
not code, were having a very significant and distorting effect on 
the dependant variable. 
Results: Effect Found. As claims rose from one to two 
claims to three or more claims, the likelihood of a presumed 
immateriality finding rose: from one (38.5 percent) and two 
claims (35.6 percent) to three or more claims (53.3 percent). 
This difference was statistically significant.153 
4. Hypothesis B.4: Decisions Published in the Federal 
Reporters Will Be More Likely to Contain Findings of 
Presumed Immateriality  
Some have hypothesized that the decision to find a disclo-
sure immaterial represents a quick and a quick and easy (cog-
nitively limited) way to get rid of (boring) cases that judges do 
not particularly want to spend time on.154 We can think of this 
as the lazy judges hypothesis. On this theory (to which I will 
return again when discussing the reasons that courts give to 
justify their opinions), it seems likely that courts are more 
likely to want to consider extraordinary cases that deny defen-
dants attempts to assert presumed immateriality. Such cases, 
then, would be published in the Federal Reporters at higher 
rates than cases in which courts dismiss claims as presump-
tively immaterial.155 
Results: No Effect Found. I coded for publication in both 
appellate and district court opinions. A marginally higher per-
 
court with settlement discussions, and the tolerance of the defendant for pub-
licity. There is no reason in the aggregate to believe the fact that most cases 
settle should distort a judges findings of immateriality. Cf. Krawiec & Zeiler, 
supra note 8, at 43 (stating that no analysis of decided cases accounts for the 
impact of settlement). 
 153. In the regression analysis, p=.02. 
 154. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 11114. 
 155. Federal appellate courts decide that some cases should have preceden-
tial effect, thus publishing them. Publication in the district courts occurs in 
two ways: by a courts election, which is communicated to West, or by Wests 
independent selection. 
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cent of published opinions found at least one claim presump-
tively immaterial (45.1 percent), than unpublished opinions 
(41.7 percent). However, I found no statistically significant re-
lationship between publication on the immateriality decision.156 
C. REASONING AND PRESUMED IMMATERIALITY 
When deciding to channel certain kinds of disclosures out 
of securities fraud litigations, courts apply distinctive reason-
ing. Like the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in criminal 
law and res ipsa loquitur in tort, courts apply different short-
hand labels to different findings of presumed immateriality. 
Scholars have identified four common techniques in recent 
works: (1) puffery; (2) bespeaks caution;157 (3) zero price 
change; and (4) triviality.158 Four additional labels for courts 
decisions are present in the cases: (5) failure to read; (6) fraud 
by hindsight;159 (7) truth on the market; and (8) failure to un-
derstand consequences. 
In this section, I discuss evidence relating to judges use of 
these techniques in dismissing claims as presumptively imma-
terial. My intuition was that these reasons can be identified as 
distinct doctrines and, as such, may be studied to see how they 
evolve over time. This intuition resulted in a new hypothesis. 
1. Hypothesis C.1: The Reasons Judges Give For Presumed 
Immateriality Will Shift Over Time 
This hypothesis is in tension with the docket-pruning hy-
pothesis advanced by Steven Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati.160 
Bainbridge and Gulati argue that courts use of the materiality 
 
 156. In the regression analysis, p=.52. 
 157. I am only addressing common law that bespeaks-caution techniques, 
and not application of the PSLRA Safe Harbor, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2000). The 
Safe Harbor is not an immateriality technique, but rather a statutorily created 
immunity. 
 158. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 11924. 
 159. Bainbridge and Gulati identify fraud by hindsight as a determination 
which affects scienter, which it surely does. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra 
note 8, at 127. However, as Gulati and others elsewhere have hypothesized, 
courts might apply fraud by hindsight to determine materiality as well. Gulati 
et al., supra note 29, 78891. To the extent that courts stated that they were 
determining that disclosures were immaterial as a matter of lawbecause to 
hold otherwise would sanction fraud by hindsightI coded accordingly, even if 
this determination is logically not related to a true materiality determina-
tion. 
 160. See generally Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8. 
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decision functions to slash 4060 percent of issues from a law-
suit at every opportunity.161 In theory, this pruning would be 
relatively random:162 there would be no reason why the doc-
trine would be coherent over time. 
My inability to find a relationship between time and pre-
sumed immateriality seriously undermines the explanatory 
power of the docket-pruning hypothesis. Docket pruning treats 
materiality as a tool in the judicial docket-reduction arsenal, 
which itself has waxed in strength over the years. In particular, 
summary judgment has gained legitimacy as a judicial tool.163 
But presumed immateriality is insensitive to time; it has nei-
ther grown nor shifted in a way that is attributable to factors 
other than chance. Obviously, if materiality were a mere prun-
ing shear, it would have cut larger swatches from cases over 
time. 
Even if it did not, docket pruning assumes that the meth-
ods of presumed immateriality are not significant. However, if 
the reasons for presumed immateriality decisions have under-
gone a noticeable shift over time, such shifting rationales would 
suggest a degree of intellectual coherence at any given moment 
in time that the docket-pruning model eschews.164 Therefore, 
we need to examine why courts say that they are finding claims 
presumptively immaterial. 
Before I test hypothesis C.1, I will briefly describe each of 
the materiality techniques. Table 2 is a descriptive look at the 








 161. In one sense, this docket-pruning model is related to the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis, discussed infra. 
 162. I am grateful to Larry Solum for pointing this out to me. 
 163. See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and 
the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1266 (2005) (discussing the rise 
in summary judgments as part of a judicial ideology centered on facilitating 
resolution of disputes). 
 164. This is not to say that the two models are mutually exclusive. Judges 
may be using presumed immateriality techniques to prune their dockets even 
as they impose a model of investor behavior. 
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Table 2: Presumed Immateriality Techniques 
 





Prevalence in Cases 
Finding Presumed 
Immateriality166 
Trivial 58 15.1% 34.3% 
Understand 
Consequences 
56 14.5% 33% 
Bespeaks 
Caution 
34 8.8% 20.1% 
Other 32 8.3% 18.9% 
Truth on the 
Market 
25 6.5% 14.8% 
Puffery 23 7.1% 13.6% 
Failure to Read 18 4.7% 10.7% 
Fraud by 
Hindsight 
15 3.9% 8.9% 
Obscure 13 3.4% 7.7% 
a. Four Traditional Materiality Techniques 
First, courts dismiss certain types of statements as mere 
puffery that a reasonable investor would ignore.167 Puffery is a 
vague statement[] of corporate optimism168 that is so obvi-
ously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable 
minds could not differ.169 As Judge Learned Hand described: 
There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes se-
riously, and if he does he suffers from his credulity.170 In a 
 
 165. Because this table offers a descriptive picture of the data, I include 
both repeated cases and unique ones. In the statistical testing that follows, I 
remove the nonunique data. 
 166. Because multiple techniques could be present in each case, some per-
centages will exceed 100 percent. 
 167. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 94. 
 168. Jennifer OHare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-
emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1697, 1697 (1998); see COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 297; see also 
Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other Loophole Claims: How the Laws Dont 
Ask, Dont Tell Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & 
COM. 49, 61 (1998). Puffery in securities cases acts like puffery in advertising 
cases, where the FTC has adopted a standard that makes puffing statements 
that ordinary citizens ought not to believe nonactionable. Id.  
 169. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (inter-
nal quotations omitted). 
 170. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 
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sense, puffery acts to excuse corporate overoptimism: People in 
charge of an enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fear-
ful or defeatist view of the future . . . .171 
For the purposes of this Article, I coded for the puffery 
technique whenever the court explicitly used the word in dis-
missing statements as presumptively immaterial. I also 
marked the technique as present when courts found statements 
to be presumptively immaterial because of their vagueness, 
general optimism, or lack of specificity, even if they did not use 
the word puff or puffery. Examples include the following: 
• A statement by the attorney for the fighting promoter Don 
King, facing possible indictment, that he did not expect 
any problems for King was like the claims of campaign 
managers before election . . . designed to allay the suspicion 
which would attend their absence than to be understood as 
having any relation to the objective truth.172 
• A statement by an IBM executive during a conference call 
that were notdespite your anxietyconcerned about be-
ing able to cover the dividend for quite a foreseeable time 
was plainly an expression of optimism that [was] too in-
definite to be actionable.173 
As recently as 2002, the conventional wisdom held that the 
puffery defense was moribund and had all but gone the way of 
the dodo,174 although recent publications argue that it has 
come back to life.175 
 
1918). 
 171. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 112930 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 172. World Series of Casino Gambling, Inc. v. King, No. 85 Civ. 1239, 1986 
WL 12525, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1986). 
 173. In re Intl Bus. Mach. Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 174. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 3424. The conventional wisdom 
has evolved. [A]las, however, the puffing concept in the securities context, 
which for decades had all but gone the way of the dodo, has recently experi-
enced a revival. Id. 
 175. OHare, supra note 168, at 170911 (relying on anecdotal evidence to 
question that account); cf. Roussel, supra note 22, at 1053 ([T]he Corporate 
Puffery Defense is less familiar to the judiciary and doctrinally underdevel-
oped by commentators.). Arguably, the resurgence in puffery coincides with 
Judge Wilkinsons decision in Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th 
Cir. 1993). Raab (ironically) followed closely on Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, which held that statements in a proxy that a merger price was fair 
and would yield high value, according to the companys directors, could give 
rise to liability under the Exchange Act, 501 U.S. 1083, 109098 (1991). I am 
grateful to a reader of this paper in draft, Mike OShea, for noticing that my 
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Second, courts apply the so-called bespeaks caution doc-
trine, which holds that fraud claims based on allegedly mis-
leading predictions are negated by other cautionary statements 
that courts take to cure the fraud.176 Unlike puffery, bespeaks 
caution relies on the presence of warnings to dismiss forecasts 
(whether specific or vague). 
In my analysis, I coded for the bespeaks-caution technique 
when courts explicitly used the term and when courts used cau-
tionary or risk-sharing statements in one part of a disclosure to 
negate the importance of other disclosures, even in the absence 
of the words bespeaks caution. Examples include the follow-
ing: 
• Investors in a limited partnership designed to produce in-
come from oil and gas properties alleged that the brokers 
had told them the investment was low or no risk.177 A 
written brochure also stated that the partnership would 
feature regular cash distributions, no exploration risk, 
and that the investments would meet the needs of income-
oriented investors.178 The brochure, however, incorporated 
a Prospectus, which warned that there is a risk that esti-
mates of future prices or costs . . . may prove to be inaccu-
rate, that the organizers had limited experience in assess-
ing oil and gas properties, and that all estimates (of risk 
and return) in the prospectus were to some degree specula-
tive.179 Under the bespeaks-caution doctrine, any investors 
relying on the oral or written representations promising low 
risks in the face of many cautionary statements clearly did 
so unreasonably.180 
• Purchasers of stock in the Donna Karan International ini-
tial public offering alleged fraud, partially based on state-
ments regarding the corporations beauty division, such as 
the success of the Companys fragrance products is evi-
denced by the continued annual sales growth of each such 
 
results seem to suggest a growth in puffery after Raab and for making the 
connection with Virginia Bankshares. 
 176. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that Bespeak Cau-
tion, 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1993); Jennifer OHare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks 
Caution Doctrine: Its Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 619 (1997) 
(discussing the doctrine). 
 177. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 120001. 
 180. Id. at 1202. 
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product since its launch.181 The corporation made these 
statements when the division was losing money and posed a 
significant operational problem for the corporation as a 
whole.182 However, the prospectus also bespoke caution: the 
division had never made money, was not expected to be 
profitable in 1996, and was planning the inherently risky 
and expensive launch of a new fragrance.183 The court 
found the earlier statements to be presumptively immate-
rial. 
Scholars have observed that the bespeaks-caution tech-
nique enjoys wide acceptance among the courts,184 and is one 
of the three most important developments in securities law in 
the last twenty years.185 
A third technique is the zero price change. In rare cases, in 
the absence of market effects from a given price change, courts 
determine disclosures were immaterial as a matter of law.186 
Courts infer from the absence of price movement that the dis-
closure was presumptively immaterial to a reasonable investor. 
Surprisingly, the presumption is unilateral.187 This technique 
is intertwined with the causation requirement in some securi-
ties cases. That is, plaintiffs may rely on a presumption of cau-
sation-in-fact, which may be rebutted in the absence of market 
movement.188 I coded for application of this technique either 
when the court applied a market test, or when it noted evidence 
that investors did not sell their holdings in reaction to disclo-
sure.189 Although it would seem the technique should be ap-
plied only following a price analysis which corrected for the ef-
fects of market movement, generally, and industry effects, in 
 
 181. Portanesse v. Donna Karan Intl, Inc., No. 97-CV-2011 CBA, 1998 WL 
637547, at *68 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1998). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *13. 
 184. Roussel, supra note 22, at 1053. 
 185. Langevoort, supra note 22, at 479. 
 186. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 12324. 
 187. Id. at 124. 
 188. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Natl Indem. Ins., 319 
F.3d 205, 21819 (5th Cir. 2003) (equating the cause-in-fact requirement with 
actual reliance on an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 189. Compare Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 16667 (2d Cir. 
1980) (analyzing the failure of institutional investors to sell stock), with Gan-
ino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 222, 227 (D. Conn. 1999) (examining 
New York Stock Exchange trading information following disclosure and find-
ing there was no movement in the Citizens stock following the announcement 
and within days thereafter, the price of the stock increased). 
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particular, courts seemed to be unconcerned with such nice-
ties.190 
Fourth is the trivial matters technique, with which courts 
hold presumptively immaterial nondisclosures relating to small 
percentages of total sales or revenues.191 I coded for the appli-
cation of the trivial matters technique whenever a court found 
that information was too numerically or financially unimpor-
tant to be material, including evaluations of the likeliness of a 
future event (such as a merger). Note that while trivial matters 
may look like puffery, a companys vague or overoptimistic 
statements of fact amount to puffery because of the language of 
the statements; here, they are immaterial based on an eco-
nomic conclusion about the relationship of the underlying facts 
to the financial status of the company as a whole. Examples in-
cluding the following. 
• An energy firms inflation of revenues of $217 million due to 
round-trip trading of an energy firm represented only 0.3 
percent of total revenues in the relevant time period. On a 
motion to dismiss, the inflation was therefore immaterial 
as a matter of law, despite evidence of price decline when 
the round-tripping allegations became public.192 
• In a suit for failure to disclose merger negotiations in a reg-
istration statement issued pursuant to a debt offering, 
plaintiffs alleged that two large corporations began merger 
negotiations in April 1993, had signed confidentiality 
agreements, and had agreed in principal on the ratio of 
shares to be exchanged and the management of a combined 
company, before the negotiations broke down.193 At the time 
of the nondisclosure, the companies remained in contact, 
but were not actually negotiating.194 Subsequently, the 
merger discussions resumed and were consummated.195 The 
court found that even if one stretches the concept of pre-
liminary negotiations as far as it can go, remaining in con-
 
 190. See, e.g. Ganino, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 227; Leventhal v. Tow, 48 F. Supp. 
2d 104, 116 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding that a price increase within several days 
of disclosure belies . . . claims of a stunning negative disclosure of a material 
nature). 
 191. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 125. 
 192. In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 282 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 193. Nelson v. Paramount Commcns, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 194. Id. at 1244. 
 195. Id. at 124546. 
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tact with someone after one has broken off formal negotia-
tions does not seem to be included. Stated another way, to 
call this state of affairs material would make just about 
anything at all material.196 
b. The Second Set of Techniques 
The next set of techniques are less commonly applied than 
the four well-known methods discussed above. Scholarly litera-
ture infrequently explores these techniques; for some methods, 
this Article provides the first detailed description and analysis. 
Courts regularly criticize investors for failing a duty to 
read about their investments.197 I coded for this technique in 
two contexts. First, courts sometimes contrast oral statements, 
alleged to be material, with written disclaimers, holding that 
the written disclaimer trumped the oral one, making it pre-
sumptively immaterial.198 Second, and more commonly, courts 
state that investors should read all parts of a given disclosure 
(or related disclosures) together and that no one statement can 
be evaluated in isolation.199 This technique differs from be-
speaks caution in that it applies when one part of the disclo-
sure contradicts or helps to contextualize another part. It also 
applies when oral and written statements conflict with each 
other. 
Sixth, courts deny plaintiffs the ability to prove fraud by 
hindsight.200 Courts insist that plaintiffs plead more than sim-
ply bad outcomes, but rather that they produce information 
that would lead objective parties to believe the actors had 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996). 
But see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for 
Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Cus-
tomers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 68283 (1996) (Ready characterization of a fail-
ure to read a dense and detailed prospectus as reckless is troublesome on a 
number of levels. Most obviously, there is an empirical problem. It is awkward 
to use the term reckless to describe behavior that is quite normal and ex-
pected.). The SEC appears to reject the reckless approach. See In re Robert 
A. Foster, 51 S.E.C. 1211, 1213 (1994) (Those who sell securities by means of 
representations inconsistent with [written disclosures] do so at their peril. 
(quoting In re Ross Secs., Inc. 41 S.E.C. 509, 510 (1963))). 
 198. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196, 120001 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 199. See Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 70506 (D. Conn. 
1992) (rejecting a bright-line test). 
 200. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 128 (stating that fraud by 
hindsight goes to scienter); Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 81618. 
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knowledge of fraud at the time of the nondisclosure.201 There-
fore, courts will dismiss pleadings that depend on hindsight to 
prove materiality.202 I coded for the presence of fraud by hind-
sight even in the absence of these magic words.203 
Previous work on this doctrine found that only 2 percent of 
cases, a handful, analyzing the fraud by hindsight technique 
involved materiality determinations.204 
The seventh technique used in finding presumed immate-
riality is the so-called truth-on-the-market doctrine.205 Courts 
apply the truth-on-the-market technique to find presump-
tively immaterial nondisclosures, which would have provided 
the investor information available from another publicly avail-
able source.206 For example, the Second Circuit concluded that 
failure to disclose a potential directors problems with organ-
ized labor, which might otherwise have been a material omis-
sion, was presumptively immaterial because these difficulties 
were reported countrywide in the press and on radio and televi-
sion, were discussed in Congress, and were analyzed in pub-
lished administrative and judicial opinions.207 
The Second Circuit has cautioned that [t]he truth-on-the-
market defense is intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appro-
priate basis for dismissing a § 10(b) complaint for failure to 
plead materiality.208 
Eighth, courts assume that disclosures need not be consid-
ered misleading simply because they do not explain the likely 
economic, financial, and legal consequences of the information 
 
 201. See Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 781. 
 202. Judge Friendlys treatment of this issue is paradigmatic. Denny v. 
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 203. Cf. In re Union Carbide Sec. Lit., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (To permit these omissions to constitute a securities action would allow 
future plaintiffs to walk into court with a materiality through hindsight cause 
of action.). 
 204. See Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 80709 (noting that a first round of 
coding had produced a significantly higher number of cases). 
 205. See Ganino v. Citizens Utils., Co. 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 206. See generally COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 297 (discussing the 
truth-on-the-market doctrine). 
 207. Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978) (A 
partys reasonable belief that the other party already has access to the facts 
should excuse him from new disclosures which reasonably appear to be repeti-
tive. (quoting Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 
(2d Cir. 1975))); id. (We agree with the district court that reasonable minds 
could not differ as to the immateriality of the omissions.). 
 208. Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167. 
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actually disclosed.209 In the Second Circuit at least, this un-
derstand consequences technique is best expressed by the 
axiom that corporations are not required to address their 
stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten.210 
Courts presume that reasonable investors are able to add two 
plus two: once a corporation has disclosed information, four is 
not a separate material fact that needs to be disclosed.211 
Courts presume that reasonable investors possess certain basic 
knowledge and skills. These include understanding: basic ideas 
about taxation of different investments,212 that shares may be 
valued using different methodologies and appreciating the dif-
ferences based on relevant underlying facts,213 that corporate 
managers are self-interested and wish to retain control,214 and 
basic accounting treatment.215 
Finally, my analysis also coded for obscure decisions216 
and for an other category.217 
Results: Some Effects Found. Figure 5 is a descriptive look 
at the shift in the presumed immateriality techniques over 
time. I took the five most common techniques from Table 2, and 
plotted their relative use by courts in the studied time period. 
 
 209. This technique, which I identified from the case law, inverts the bur-
ied facts doctrine. Under that doctrine a filing may be deemed materially mis-
leading, despite having disclosed all material information, if the information is 
not properly highlighted. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 
F.2d 761, 77374 (3d Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 
579, 603 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 210. See Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 211. Cf. Beaumont v. Am. Can Co., 621 F. Supp. 484, 49697 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (holding there was no requirement to perform addition of disclosed 
facts). 
 212. See Donovan v. Am. Skandia Life Assurance Corp., No. 02CV9859 MP, 
2003 WL 21757260, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003) (discussing the idea of tax 
neutrality between different types of annuities). 
 213. See In re United Brands Co. Sec. Litig., No. 85CIV5445, 1988 WL 
67413, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1988). 
 214. See Allyn Corp. v. Hartford Natl. Corp., No. H81-912, 1982 WL 1301, 
at *24 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 1982). 
 215. See Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co., 576 F. Supp. 608, 613 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). Other examples include: understanding the idea of opportu-
nity costs of real estate investments, see Kahn v. Wien, 842 F. Supp. 667, 675
76 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); and understanding the nature and scope of interest neces-
sary for a change in corporate control, see Samjens Partners I v. Burlington 
Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 216. My analysis included cases where I could not determine why a finding 
of presumed immateriality had been made. 
 217. My analysis included cases where I could determine why the court 
reasoned as it did, but there were few such instances to create a new variable. 
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Figure 5: Five Common Presumed Immateriality 
Techniques Over Time 
 
 
However, as with descriptions of the larger dataset, Figure 
5 is somewhat misleading. Puffery and bespeaks caution 
have changed in statistically significant ways over time,218 but 
I found no statistically significant decrease in the remaining 
techniques, although understand consequences and trivial-
ity appeared in relatively fewer opinions in recent opinions. 
Nevertheless, the changes in puffery and bespeaks cau-
tion tend to confirm Hypothesis C.1, and thus significantly 
undermine the view that materiality is merely a docket-
pruning mechanism. 
 
 218. The following Table measures significance using a Pearson Chi-
Square Test. 
Table 3: Immateriality Techniques Over Time 
Technique Significant? 
Understanding Consequences No (p=.84) 
Trivial No (p=.41) 
Bespeaks Caution Yes (p<.001) 
Truth on the Market No (p=.67) 
Puffery Yes (p=.08) 
Failure to Read No (p=.72) 
Fraud by Hindsight No (p=.35) 
Zero Price Change No (p=.36) 
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2. Hypothesis C.2: Presumed Immateriality Techniques Will 
Come Packaged into Analytical Toolboxes 
If the immateriality techniques are doctrinal tools used for 
some end other than that of random docket reduction, then it 
makes sense that courts will develop clusters of techniques to 
use in attacking fact patterns and will use the techniques at 
distinct stages in the life of a lawsuit. 
Two predictions follow. First, we would predict that be-
speaks caution will be more likely to occur when other, related, 
techniques also occurpuffery, failure to read, and truth on the 
market. These techniques share a basic approach to material-
ity, one that requires courts merely to parse the words of a le-
gal document or contemporaneous news release instead of en-
gaging in concrete business judgments. Conversely, courts 
should use techniques like understand consequences and 
triviality at the same time. 
Second, puffery, failure to read and truth on the mar-
ket should be correlated with earlier stages in the lawsuit, as 
these techniques do not, on their face, require searching in-
quiry into the facts for their force to be felt.  
Results: Effects Found. Table 4 displays the result of a cor-
relation coefficient test,219 and lists only those techniques 
which are correlated with others. It tests hypothesis C.2, ask-
ing: when one technique is present in a case, are others likely 
to be present as well? 
 
Table 4: Correlation Between Techniques 
 
 Failure to 
Read 
Truth on the 
Market 




(p<.001) (p=.002) (p<.001)  
Trivial 
Matters 
   (p<.001) 
 
Based on this evidence, courts applying the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine to a given set of disclosures are also likely to use 
the techniques of puffery, truth on the market, and inves-
tors failure to read. Courts applying the trivial matters doc-
 
 219. See generally BARNES, supra note 142, at 265 (describing correlation 
coefficients). 
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trine are likely to also apply the fraud by hindsight doctrine. I 
did not find a significant relationship between trivial matters 
and understand consequences, nor did I find a negative corre-
lation between the first and second set of techniques.220 
Testing the relationship between the techniques and pro-
cedural posture found some evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that bespeaks caution and puffery were more likely to be 
applied on a motion to dismiss.221 
 
Table 5: Techniques v. Procedural Posture 
 
 Bespeaks Caution Puffery 
Motion to Dismiss p=.002 p<.001 
D. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
For many readers, the main contribution of this Article will 
be its finding that judges applied presumed immateriality at a 
high rate in the studied time period. In private plaintiff actions, 
approximately half (51 percent) of the opinions dismissed at 
least one claim as immaterial, resulting in a large set of opin-
ions in which courts defend and define their vision of who is, 
and is not, a reasonable shareholder. 
The results also undermine the extant hypotheses that ex-
plain courts use of materiality: the corporate activity hy-
pothesis, the conservative and lazy judges hypotheses, and 
the docket-pruning hypothesis.222 Significantly, I failed to find 
a significant relationship between either time or procedure and 
findings of presumed immateriality. I did find a strong effect 
based on party identity. 
Other readers, practicing lawyers in particular, will be in-
terested to learn which techniques appeal to courts when ex-
 
 220. An earlier draft of this Article noted a negative correlation between 
techniques, but further analysis demonstrated that the negative relationship 
was not robust. 
 221. I also found a negative correlation between bespeaks caution and a 
plaintiff s request for injunctive relief; however I believe that relationship to 
be an artifact of other characteristics of the data. 
 222. Michael Perinos draft paper on the effect of ideology on district court 
decision making appears to reject a version of the conservative judge hy-
pothesis with respect to interpretations of the PSLRAs new pleading stan-
dard. See Perino, supra note 29, at 46 (concluding that district court judges 
make strategic decisions, rather than simply ideological ones). Perinos inter-
esting study suggests that a comparison of materiality decisions across circuits 
would prove quite valuable. 
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plaining findings of presumed immateriality. Over time, as I 
have explored, courts have become more willing to apply puff-
ery and bespeaks caution doctrines which are (1) bright-line 
rules that focus on the language of disclosures, (2) associated 
with each other, and (3) more likely to appear at early stages in 
lawsuits. 
 These findings suggest that courts are not using materi-
ality to effect mere conservative ends nor to change corporate 
behavior, but instead to change the behavior of prospective 
plaintiffsordinary investors in the capital markets. That is, 
because plaintiff identity is so important, and because materi-
ality has moved toward a set of bright-line rules, ordinary in-
vestors will have strong incentives to conform their conduct to 
that deemed reasonable by courts or be denied recovery. To see 
how realistic that expectation is, we must return to the rela-
tionship between BLE and the securities laws, focusing now on 
the ways in which the presumed immateriality techniques 
make counterfactual assumptions about how investors act. 
III.  BLE AND THE PRESUMED  
IMMATERIALITY TECHNIQUES 
A. PUFFERY AND BESPEAKS CAUTION: INVESTOR STATES OF 
MIND 
When disclosures or omissions are found to be immaterial 
based on the puffery doctrine, courts make an assumption 
about investor reaction to disclosure: reasonable investors do 
not invest capital based on optimism but, instead, invest based 
on facts. 
However, under many circumstances, BLE would predict 
the reverse.223 The puffery doctrine ignores the powerful effects 
of loss aversion. Investors whose stock has lost value are risk 
seeking and more likely to act on positive disclosures with 
weak informational content.224 Similarly, the puffery doctrine 
ignores the perversion of rationality that accompanies our pow-
 
 223. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 120 (Anecdotally, it does 
not take much time watching investment programs on television to notice that 
even quite vague statements of optimism by corporate managers are consid-
ered important by the investment news media.); Huang, supra note 24, at 115 
([P]uffery defense is flawed because vague, promotional, or hyperbolic state-
ments can have real impacts on moods and therefore should not be deemed 
immaterial as a matter of law.). 
 224. See supra notes 6771 and accompanying text. 
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erful overoptimism bias. When a corporation states that market 
conditions are likely to improve, and we already own some of 
its stock, we are likely to think to ourselves, of course my stock 
will do better than average.225 Arguing that puffing state-
ments will not be relied on also ignores possible endowment ef-
fects, experiential thinking,226 information overload,227 source 
blindness,228 and herd behavior.229 
Experimental literature analyzing puffery confirms that 
individuals are unable to ignore vague optimism and expres-
sions of confidence.230 Indeed, subjects believe that statements 
making factual claims (27 miles per gallon on regular gas) 
were indistinguishable from statements the law would consider 
puffery (truly excellent gas mileage).231 Overall, no behav-
ioral studies have reported the finding, assumed by the law, 
that consumers typically see puffery . . . as meaningless.232 
Liberal use of the bespeaks-caution technique also contra-
dicts BLE insights.233 Not surprisingly, only rarely did I find 
 
 225. See supra notes 7582 and accompanying text. 
 226. To the extent that our assessment of risk is colored by our emotional 
assessment of the target, generally positive statements may drape the invest-
ment with a penumbra of positive feeling, leading us to discount later specific 
information to the contrary. See supra notes 8391 and accompanying text. 
 227. For investors confronted with a large disclosure, early puffery (such 
as, our business model remains strong) may be incorporated into the invest-
ing decision, while later financial disclosures in dense footnotes would be ig-
nored. I would provide a citation from a case here, but I sense the reader 
might be overwhelmed by the detail. 
 228. See supra notes 9298 and accompanying text. 
 229. When puffery is in a press release or made through a corporate 
spokesperson, it seems likely that investors will respond to social cues and 
trust the corporate managers statements of vague optimism, especially if oth-
ers in the market do so. 
 230. See generally Preston, supra note 168, at 8083. For example, subjects 
shown Minute Rices claim to make [p]erfect rice every time believed the 
statement was true, either completely or partially, 73 percent of the time and 
64 percent of subjects believe, either completely or partially, that Coke is, in-
deed, the real thing. Id. at 80.  
 231. Id. at 82. 
 232. Id. at 8283. The seminal work in the marketing literature on puffery 
remains IVAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP: PUFFERY IN AD-
VERTISING AND SELLING (rev. ed. 1996) (evaluating puffery along a spectrum 
and its deceptiveness). But cf. Jef I. Richards, A New and Improved View of 
Puffery, 9 J. PUB. POLY & MARKETING 73 (1990) (criticizing Preston and other 
researchers for using an overly broad definition of legal puffery). 
 233. See Huang, supra note 24, at 12526 ([The doctrine is] problematic 
because meaningful cautionary language concerns the probability of the opti-
mistic forward-looking statements being realized. But, if those optimistic 
statements have induced positive moods or emotional reactions, such feelings 
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that courts applying the bespeaks-caution doctrine did so based 
on an empirical analysis of whether shareholders actually re-
acted to disclosures which were subject to cautions.234 Thus, 
courts increased use of the doctrine represents a mere assump-
tion that cautionary statements obviate the reasonableness of 
reliance by reasonable investors on earlier forecasts, whether 
positive or negative. 
Not only do individuals have the problems of risk process-
ing, endowment, experiential thinking, and information over-
load, they are also unable to make the subtle adjustment with 
respect to informational source, as courts applying the be-
speaks-caution doctrine require them to do. Courts assume that 
individuals can hear a source saying two thingsI express the 
following beliefs about the future and Dont rely on anything I 
just saidand make a rational decision about which state-
ment is worthy of credence. This is nonsense. 
Puffery and bespeaks caution are alike in another way: 
they attempt to create bright-line rules to differentiate reason-
able from unreasonable reliance.235 Both doctrines are easy to 
apply (they require merely the presence or absence of certain 
magic words) and easy to create from the perspective of the dis-
closing entity. That is, disclosing entities can shelter question-
able information from fraud claims by making it part of opti-
mistic predictions or pairing it with cautions. Notably, both 
doctrines create incentives for corporations to use words that 
they hope will induce reliance, but which may be rendered le-
gally irrelevant; they are bright-line rules that enable fraud. 
B. UNDERSTAND CONSEQUENCES AND TRIVIALITY 
Let us compare puffery and bespeaks caution with un-
derstanding consequences and triviality. Both the under-
standing consequences and triviality techniques focus on the 
relationship between the disclosed facts and the real world. For 
understanding consequences, courts focused on the underlying 
facts disclosed, not the language of the offering document, and 
the relationship between those facts and either (a) the real 
world or (b) a hypothesized skill set possessed by investors. The 
 
are insensitive to probability variations.). 
 234. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 123 (criticizing courts for 
drawing conclusions about the impact of cautionary statements without con-
ducting behavioral research). 
 235. Cf. Roussel, supra note 22, at 1068 (indicating that parts of puffery 
doctrine lend themselves to a bright-line test). 
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triviality doctrine also contrasts with evidence from BLE. It 
boils down to an intuition that trivial bits of information do 
not play a role in the investment decisions of reasonable inves-
tors because they relate to a small aspect of the business.236 
But, as BLE teaches, investors are poor at making this type of 
comparison. 
Neither of these techniques is without flaws. Indeed, they 
both support Langevoorts view that judges in securities cases 
are subject to lawyers biases,237 which make them overconfi-
dent with respect to their ability to understand how the world 
really works, complete with a sneer toward laypeople who 
do not understand the game.238 Empathy for investor incompe-
tence is hard for judges who always analyze disclosures in 
hindsight armed with briefs which explain financial, account-
ing, and legal concepts in concise, readable ways.239 Moreover, 
courts regularly assume individuals will be able to rationally 
understand the likelihood of potential future gains, or unlikely 
future legal problems, despite humans inability to rationally 
calculate the effect of unlikely, but catastrophic, events. 
Ultimately, the shift I have noted is a shift from a stan-
dard-based model of materiality to a model based on bright-line 
rules, in which courts spend less time considering the potential 
effects of the disclosure and more time applying a mechanistic 
set of rules to the words of the disclosure itself.240 Such bright-
 
 236. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 125. 
 237. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 318. 
 238. I am reminded of Duncan Kennedys criticism of legal education, in 
which he argued: 
The final hierarchy that concerns us is the general social arrange-
ment in which lawyers are treated . . . as among the elite of the na-
tion. Partly this is simply a reflection of the fact that many lawyers 
come from the upper middle class to start with. . . . At each level of 
the class system, lawyers are granted a measure of deference and 
measure of power altogether disproportionate to their objective merit. 
In their group activities, but also in their individual social lives, they 
tend to exploit this deference and to accentuate it by emphasizing the 
arcane character of what they know and do. 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERAR-
CHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 57 (2004). 
 239. It should be self-evident that legal briefs are more likely to clearly ex-
plain a disclosure than a corporations 10-K statement. 
 240. As discussed above, see supra note 143 and accompanying text, it is 
possible that plaintiffs are bringing different kinds of cases today than in the 
past, and thus judges are using different kinds of doctrines in response. This 
hypothesis is subject to empirical testing, but it does not seem self-evident to 
me that the reasons courts use to instantiate reasonableness should change 
based on the nature of the disclosures plaintiffs claim to be fraudulent. 
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line rules require judges merely to parse the words in certain, 
legally important documents instead of engaging in business 
judgments. This is a troublesome development, for reasons dis-
cussed in Part IV. 
C. OTHER DOCTRINES 
Although the four techniques we have just discussed are 
the headlines of my results, it is worth thinking briefly about 
the relationship between the other doctrines in the arsenals of 
courts and BLE. As we will see, each of the remaining four 
classic techniques relies on assumptions about human behavior 
which are sometimes, if not always, untrue. 
1. Zero Price Change 
The zero-price-change doctrine relies on the same assump-
tion of market efficiency that permits securities claims to pro-
ceed without proof of actual reliance.241 That is, courts assume 
that markets will react to any price relevant information.242 
This intuition is the same as that which would conclude 
that framing effects ought to have no relationship to out-
comesthat saving two of six people is the same as killing four 
out of six. Failure to react to information may be a result of 
BLE heuristics and biases, instead of anything internal to the 
importance of the disclosure itself. 
It may be interesting to consider zero price change in the 
context of the Sherlock Holmes story of the dog that did not 
bark in the nighttime.243 While Holmes concluded that silence 
is necessarily consequential, the empirics of this claim are du-
bious.244 Indeed, use of nonmarket impact to establish material-
 
 241. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 12324. 
 242. Of course, markets may be rational even when individual participants 
are not. See, e.g., Hilton, supra note 81, at 274 (discussing political futures 
markets). 
 243. Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention? 
To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time. 
The dog did nothing in the night-time. 
That was the curious incident, remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
A. Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK 
HOLMES 1213 (Schocken Books 1976) (18921893). 
 244. Intuitions about the importance of silence are common in the legal 
academy, especially when thinking about statutory interpretation. See, e.g., 
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inserverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 270 n.207 (2004). I have not seen a theoretical, unified 
approach to silence by legislatures, courts, individuals, etc. For the beginning 
HOFFMAN_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:02:57 PM 
2006] DUTY TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER 591 
 
ity at the time of the investing decision is a decision infected 
with hindsight bias. Such bias would seem more balanced if 
courts allowed evidence of actual market effects to mean mate-
riality as a matter of law. 
Courts appear reluctant to apply the zero-price-change 
technique: only 3 percent of cases finding any claim presump-
tively immaterial used it. However, my sense of the case law is 
that defendants make zero-price-change arguments often.245 It 
is interesting and worth further study to think about why 
courts are able to resist the conclusion that market silence 
should speak loudly. 
2. Fraud by Hindsight, Failure to Read, and Truth on the 
Market 
Courts use of the doctrine of fraud by hindsight appears to 
be a direct application of the doctrine of presumed immaterial-
ity to correct a bias which would otherwise lead to an inappro-
priate finding of materiality.246 Only a small number of securi-
ties cases apply the doctrine to materiality rather than scienter 
determinations,247 although around 10 percent of cases finding 
a claim immaterial cited fraud by hindsight as one of the rea-
sons supporting the decision.248 
Courts criticisms of investors who fail to read a large uni-
verse of information and who rely on oral, rather than written, 
materials is understandable. The failure-to-read doctrine 
serves the same ends as most formalities.249 Courts concerned 
about the prevalence of securities suits do well to insist on the 
primacy of written material. Thus, the failure-to-read tech-
nique acts as a common law statute of frauds in securities 
cases. 
 
of such a work, see Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of 
Megans Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 157694 (2004) (discussing causes and 
remedies for silence in discussing race with respect to community notification 
laws). 
 245. Defendants make these arguments for at least two reasons. They may 
be undertaking loss causation (reliance) analyses independently and hope to 
take two shots at a winning argument. Or, they may be unaware of how rarely 
such defenses succeed. 
 246. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory, supra note 54, at 108. 
 247. See Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 807. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. 
REV. 799 (1941) (arguing that legal formalities can serve consideration, chan-
neling, and evidentiary functions). 
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Finally, the truth-on-the-market technique imposes search 
costs on investors and ignores evidence that more information 
may not improve the quality of investing decisions. For courts 
applying this technique, the idea that an omission cannot be 
material if it replicates publicly available information makes a 
great deal of sense. Nevertheless, increased use of this tech-
nique makes investors responsible for understanding and proc-
essing a bewildering array of information. Whether all inves-
tors are equally capable of making this kind of search and 
analysis is questionable.250 Nonetheless, the truth-on-the-
market technique is relatively prevalent, appearing in 6.5 per-
cent of the total dataset, and in 14.8 percent of cases finding 
any claim immaterial.251 
In Table 6, I summarize the preceding discussion by con-
necting each of the eight named techniques with the BLE ob-
servations that the technique potentially ignores. 
 
 
 250. For further discussion of the problems of applying the truth-on-the-
market doctrine, see Huang, supra note 24, at 11822. 
 251. See supra Table 2. 
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Table 6: Relationship of BLE to Presumed Immateriality 






















Truth on the  
M
arket 
Trouble with Probability 
Hindsight Bias   X   X   
Representativeness Heuristic X   X X  X  
Risk Seeking (Mitigate 
Current Losses) X X  X X  X  
Risk Aversion (Gains)   X  X X  X  
Endowment Effect X X  X X  X  
Overconfidence X X  X X  X X 
Experiential Thinking X X  X X X X X 
Information Processing 
Source Blindness X X  X  X  X 
Overweighing Oral Disclosures  X   X X  X 
Framing Effect  X  X  X X  








Herd Behavior X X  X X X X  
 Percentage of Cases Finding Presumed Immateriality That Applied Technique (Average) 
  14 20 9 3 34 11 33 15 
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In considering the implications of the results displayed in 
Table 6, we can see that all of the techniques, to one degree or 
another, make assumptions about behavior which are funda-
mentally in tension with how BLE predicts investors will some-
times behave. Puffery, for example, is a doctrine that most ob-
viously affects individuals trouble with probabilistic assess-
ments, while the failure-to-read heuristic is primarily in ten-
sion with individuals inabilities to process information ration-
ally. 
The previous two Parts of this Article considered the de-
scriptive question of the scope and nature of presumed immate-
riality doctrine in the published opinions in the Second Circuit 
and its district courts. To the extent that the sample was a good 
one, it seems fair to step back and offer a few general observa-
tions about how courts apply the reasonable-investor standard. 
(1) Reasonable investors are platonic models, immune to those 
 behavioral biases and heuristics which distort the decision 
 making of actual market participants. 
(2) Courts are willing to punish actual investors for failing to 
 live up to the expectations created by their model 
 counterparts. 
(3) The standards primary effects are likely to be felt by  
 investors, rather than disclosing corporate entities. 
(4) Courts are increasingly advancing explanations for pre-
 sumed immateriality that encourage manipulation of the 
 law with magic words. 
The next Part of this Article considers the ways in which 
these characteristics together suggest that presumed immate-
riality functions to create a novel, legal duty for investors to be 
economically rational actors. 
IV.  THE DUTY TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER 
The shift in the rationale for findings of presumed imma-
teriality over time from standards to bright-line rules suggests 
that materiality is evolving toward a formal choice: investors 
must behave in a certain way or suffer the consequences. One 
way to understand the federal disclosure and liability regime is 
as a federally mandated and defined insurance against securi-
ties fraud,252 conditioned on a finding of materiality.253 This in-
 
 252. See David Tabak, Loss Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class 
Actions: When It Takes Two Steps to Tango 14 (May 2004) (Natl Econ. Re-
search Assocs.), available at http://www.nera.com/image/200405Tabak_Loss_ 
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surance benefit is generally available to all investors in feder-
ally registered securities and pays out if and when an inves-
tor has been harmed by fraud and files suit. There are then two 
logically equivalent narratives explaining how the law distrib-
utes this benefit: (1) To get the benefit of securities insurance, 
you should invest rationally in response to disclosure, or (2) all 
investors will receive the benefit of securities insurance, unless 
they act irrationally in response to disclosure. 
The second formulation, which suggests a punishment for 
failure to comply with a generally applicable standard, better 
captures the case laws evolving emphasis on the undesirability 
of protecting irrational investors and the increased emphasis 
on bright-line, enforceable rules. This narrative also has an im-
portant connotation: we should see presumed immateriality as 
an attempt by courts to shape the ordinary relationship be-
tween corporations and investors, not merely the contours of 
recovery in litigation. That is, we should see presumed immate-
riality as creating a legal duty to be a rational shareholder.254 
 
Causation.pdf (arguing that protection offered by securities laws exceeding 
expected yields absent the law makes the securities fraud laws a form of in-
surance). To be clear, this is just a metaphor: investors do not pay a special 
form of premium to obtain the protection of the securities laws. Although we 
might consider federal income taxes to be a kind of premium, that argument 
would seem to prove too much. 
 253. See William S. Feinstein, Comment, Securities Fraud: Pleading Secu-
rities Fraud with ParticularityFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the 
Rule 10b-5 Context: Koval v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 851, 855 n.32 (1995) (noting that problems of materiality inter-
fere with securities fraud claims). To state that securities fraud recovery pro-
vides a form of insurance to investors is not to claim that the insurance is the 
same as other types of insurance, such as car insurance. However, all insur-
ance excludes certain kinds of injuries (e.g., drunk driving) and privileges cer-
tain behaviors (e.g., a certain number of accident-free years) or demographics 
(e.g., insurance is more expensive for the very young and very old). See gener-
ally Robert H. Jerry II & Kyle Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance: An-
other Perspective, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 329, 338 (1985) (Insurers will continue to 
classify insured persons into distinct groups as long as the cost of measuring 
the differentiating factor is less than the premium reduction the insurer can 
offer the members of a differentiated, better-risk group.). 
 254. Some readers of this paper in draft have objected that it is misleading 
to call a defense in litigationa bar to liability or damagesa legal duty. 
Skepticism toward duty talk similarly appears when discussing analogous 
defenses like the duty to mitigate contract and tort damages, the duty to 
preserve evidence, and the duty to be nonnegligent (in comparative negli-
gence states). See, e.g., Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and Consequential 
Damages, 7 J.L. & COM. 327, 376 (1987) (suggesting that the duty to mitigate 
is a misnomer, because the aggrieved party incurs no actual liability for his 
failure to mitigate); Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the 
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Presumed immateriality judges investor behavior before 
injury (that is, change in share price) has occurred. Every indi-
vidual buying stock risks losing the benefit of securities insur-
ance if she is not rational.255 As a result, presumed immateri-
ality affects all investors in the capital markets.256 It conditions 
the availability of a legal benefit on compliance with a gener-
ally applicable standard of conduct, imposing on shareholders 
onerous affirmativeand conduct shapingexpectations.257 
 
 
Statutory Anti-Discrimination Context: Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 n.3 (2000) ([F]ailure to mitigate does not expose the failing 
party to any liability, as would the failure to satisfy a duty.); E. Allan Farns-
worth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1184 
(1970) (criticizing application of the term duty to the duty to mitigate con-
tract damages). Even though these duties may give rise to important affirma-
tive obligations, they arise after the cause of action has accrued. Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 97376 (1983) (discussing some 
affirmative obligations arising after the cause of action has accrued). Simi-
larly, the duty to preserve evidence at trial arises after a party has notice of 
the possibility of a suit. See Townsend v. Am. Insulated Panel Co., 174 F.R.D. 
1, 34 (D. Mass. 1997). The duty to be a rational shareholder, by contrast, 
arises before the cause of action does. See infra notes 28185 and accompany-
ing text (describing the duty to be a rational shareholder as an obligation ex-
isting independently from any correlative right to a cause of action). 
 255. Rationality, in this context, is defined as not subject to those biases 
which the presumed immateriality doctrines punish. Because the duty to be a 
rational shareholder judges conduct pre-injury, it is distinct from the duty to 
mitigate. 
 256. The idea of a victims duty in law is generally not novel. Reading this 
paper in draft, Don Langevoort reminded me that victims of fraud have long 
been subject to various duties of care. However, applying such victims duties 
in the securities context is quite controversial. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, 
Unclean Hands and Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Significance of Plaintiff Con-
duct in Actions for Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 71 MINN. L. REV. 317 
(1986) (critiquing application of the justifiable reliance doctrine); Margaret V. 
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless 
Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985) (critiquing the 
application of the duty to care to certain 10b-5 actions). 
 257. For those who have difficulty imagining how impairment of rights in 
litigation may be conceived as a duty at all, my colleague, Craig Green, sug-
gests that we imagine that the federal government has created a program that 
distributes benefits to foster parents. The government imposes certain condi-
tions on the receipt of funds (e.g., keeping the home in a certain condition, 
maintaining a stable home, making the home available for inspection); failure 
to observe the conditions will lead to a denial of funds. It seems relatively un-
controversial to imagine these conditions as duties imposed by the federal 
government on foster parents. However, they are likely to be enforced only 
when a foster parent is denied the benefits, and sues, at which time the gov-
ernment will assert that the parent has failed his duty and is not entitled to 
benefits. 
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In the absence of another compelling explanation, I think it 
fair to conclude that courts believe that shareholders ought to 
act like all other participants in the corporate governance sys-
tem: motivated by an easily comprehendible set of monetary in-
centives and subject to a clear set of bright lines to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the corporate form.258 Indeed, rational 
public shareholders are the foundation of the corporate govern-
ance system; take them away, and the entire edifice may crum-
ble. As judges have become more aware of human irrational-
itythrough increased awareness of BLE and increased 
publicity about challenges to the efficient capital market hy-
pothesisperhaps they have reacted strongly to protect the 
model of human rationality. Thus, courts are comfortable im-
posing a duty to be rational, thereby requiring investors in the 
securities context to behave like other actors in the corporate 
governance model. 
But in doing so, courts put the securities laws in tension 
with the fundamental principle of corporate governance: share-
holders owe no duties. That is, courts seeking to harmonize se-
curities and corporate law may have put the two systems in 
conflict with each other. Which will give? 
Before engaging in what might become a very large 
thought project, we should consider how we might measure the  
 
 
 258. Corporate law generally assumes and provides incentives for share-
holder profit-maximizing behavior. See Greenfield, supra note 3, at 63436. 
The ultimatum game, a well-known BLE experiment, provides a different 
perspective on this result. An experiment provides one of two people (the 
chooser) a pot of money. The chooser must decide on an allocation between 
himself and another individual (the accepting party). The chooser may de-
scribe any allocation he wishes; the accepting party may only accept or refuse 
the bargain. In the absence of acceptance, neither party takes any money. See 
generally Greenfield & Kostant, supra note 38, at 98892 (discussing variants 
of the ultimatum game and its application in legal scholarship). Economic the-
ory predicts the accepting party will accept any nonzero proposal. Id. at 988. 
However, it is quite common for the accepting party to reject offers of less than 
20 percent of the total available. Id. at 989. And, surprisingly, the choosing 
party usually offers between 40 and 50 percent of the total. Id. 
In a related experimental series, BLE practitioners analyzed individuals 
reactions to corporate cost-benefit analysis (CBA). See generally David A. Hoff-
man, How Relevant Is Jury Rationality? 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 525 (2003) 
(book review). In CBA, corporations decide between alternatives by applying 
the profit-maximization norm to the costs and benefits of action and inaction. 
See id. A robust body of literature suggests that individuals dislike CBA, espe-
cially when the decision involves possible loss of human life. See id. at 523. 
This result holds even when experimental subjects understand the benefits of 
efficiency and profit maximization. See id. at 52425. 
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actual, real-world effects of the duty that this Article has un-
covered. 
A. THE DUTY TO BE RATIONAL: SOME EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
Usually, enforcement of duties depends on the understand-
ing that ought implies can.259 But it is hard for all individual 
shareholders to react rationally in response to information. 
Many of the deviations from the model of rationality endorsed 
by the duty are unconscious products of the ways brains are 
wired to make decisions.260 Moreover, individuals may find it 
difficult to learn from their investment failures and successes: 
irrational exuberance and anxiety are not really biases to be 
unlearned.261 It may be for this reason that despite powerful 
financial incentives for markets as a whole to be efficient, re-
cent experimental and real-world testing suggests they are 
not.262 
Because irrationality is sticky behavior, the normal con-
sequences of creating legal dutiesthe modification of behav-
iormay not arise through the operation of the materiality 
doctrine. Even though the duty to be rational is increasingly 
specific and publicized, it would be very surprising if in the 
years post-TSC Industries, there was significantly less real-
world price movement in reaction to disclosures that the law 
excludes as nonactionable. Such a correlation would be evi-
dence that the duty was effective and that individuals had been 
able to somehow modify their behaviors so as to regain the pro-
tection of securities insurance. 
 
 
 259. John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-
Discrimination Principle: The Full Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibi-
tion of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 506 (2002) (citing IMMANUEL 
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 30708 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1900) 
(1781)). 
 260. See, e.g., RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW BRAIN 11215 (2003); William J. 
Gehring & Adrian R. Willoughby, The Medial Frontal Cortex and the Rapid 
Processing of Monetary Gains and Losses, 295 SCI. 2279, 227981 (2002); Colin 
Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, J. 
ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 13, http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=590965); Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and 
Neuroeconomics 711 (George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper, 
Paper No. 04-07, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 501063. 
 261. Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Se-
curities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, su-
pra note 51, at 501, 506. 
 262. See supra notes 4752 and accompanying text. 
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Those relying on the understanding-consequences tech-
nique would conclude that while full rationality (i.e., risk proc-
essing rationality) is unlikely, investors are generally intelli-
gent and able to process the idea of the rationality duty. Picture 
a somewhat ambitious investor, conscious of her limitations, 
but intelligent enough to want to do something about them. 
The best solution for her is to invest in mutual funds. 
Mutual funds and other institutional investors are proba-
bly less likely to behave irrationally in response to disclosure, 
are more likely to have lawyers and economists on staff to un-
derstand prospectus-speak, will know and have recorded all 
price relevant market information, and will be less likely to be 
swayed into following herds into investments.263 Approximately 
one-third of holdings in the U.S. stock market today are insti-
tutional (having grown from a quarter thirty years ago).264 In-
formed investors should join this tide and commit themselves 
to a course of rationality before making a potentially harmful 
decision.265 
Thus, if investors can learn of the duties imposed by the 
presumed immateriality doctrine, mutual funds might experi-
ence higher than expected capital infusions.266 This will be es-
pecially true in years after particularly important growths in 
one of the dutys constituent techniques like bespeaks cau-
tion.267 
Coincident with the effects of presumed immateriality on 
shareholders, we should also see effects on corporations. As 
 
 263. Institutional investors have extensive trading expertise and actively 
seek information about new issues as well as current holdings. See Ryan, su-
pra note 32, at 149. But cf. Kumar, supra note 53, at 78 (demonstrating that 
individual investors demonstrate a preference for stocks with lower returns). 
 264. Ryan, supra note 32, at 147. 
 265. We may analogize these kind of decisions to a driver who, knowing 
that he is particularly likely to make foolish turns at intersections, proceeds to 
rip the steering wheel from his car when he sees the intersection approaching 
and throw it out the window, thereby committing himself to a straight course. 
The most significant problem with such decision making is the presence of 
other committed drivers. 
 266. For a skeptical view of whether investors as a group can learn from 
changes in the securities laws, see Huang, supra note 24, at 115. Huang sug-
gests that investors are not a fixed group, but instead consist of an ever-
changing pool of investors, who as they become older and if wiser are replaced 
by a new cohort still wet behind the ears and ready to be misled emotionally. 
Id. 
 267. This analysis is somewhat complicated by recent publicity regarding 
unsavory practices in the mutual fund industry, which may convince investors 
that investment professionals are unlikely to have their best interests in mind. 
HOFFMAN_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:02:57 PM 
600 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:537 
 
businesses realize the protections which the doctrine offers 
them, they should feel more secure in making certain kinds of 
disclosures. Thus, I predict that corporations should increas-
ingly seek to shelter disclosure by coupling financial predictions 
with cautionary statements and encouraging investment by 
making proportionately more statements of corporate opti-
mism. 
Now, we must complicate the analysis which had previ-
ously assumed that all investors are alike. Some BLE research-
ers seek to demonstrate how rationality is a cultural con-
struction that is more likely to appeal to white men than other 
demographic groups. This literature is complex, and I can only 
offer a small taste of it here.268 One basic and well-established 
conclusion is that men and women perceive risk differently.269 
Many studies have found that on average, men are more com-
fortable with higher levels of risk, particularly environmental 
risks than women.270 Women thus exhibit higher rates of loss-
aversion than men in evaluating financial investments. Some 
have argued that this effect results from womens relative lack 
of socioeconomic power,271 while others attribute the differences 
to biology.272 
 
 268. See generally Paul Slovic et al., Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Sci-
ence: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, 
supra note 89, at 390412 (arguing for a conception of risk that highlights the 
subjective and value-laden nature of risk). 
 269. See generally Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: 
Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q. J. ECON. 261, 
262 (2001) (finding that men trade common stocks more than women and earn 
less on such investments); James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk 
Taking: A Meta-Analysis¸125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 367 (1999) (noting gender dif-
ferences in risk taking); Jan L. Hitchcock, Gender Differences in Risk Percep-
tion: Broadening the Contexts, 12 RISK 179, 18290 (2001) (summarizing mul-
tiple studies). 
 270. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the 
Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689, 692 (1999) (Several dozen 
studies have documented the finding that men tend to judge risks as smaller 
and less problematic than do women.); Kumar, supra note 53, at 13 ([S]ingle 
men exhibit a significantly stronger preference for lottery-type stocks than 
single women.). 
 271. Slovic, supra note 270, at 692 (noting that controlling for income and 
education level did not reduce the disparity between male and female risk per-
ception). But see Renate Schubert et al., Financial Decision-Making: Are 
Women Really More Risk-Averse?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 38485 (1999) (at-
tributing gender-specific risk behavior to differences in opportunity rather 
than differences in gender). 
 272. Hitchcock, supra note 269, at 19598 (discussing development re-
search). 
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Class and race also play significantly into perceptions of 
risk.273 In the literature, this is known as the white male ef-
fect.274 As a group, white men are significantly less likely to be 
concerned about higher levels of risk and tolerate higher losses 
than minorities.275 This effect too is related to feelings of vul-
nerability and disempowerment: [minorities] benefit less from 
many of [the worlds] technologies and institutions, and 
. . . they have less power and control over what happens in 
their communities and their lives.276 
This discussion leads to a final prediction. Presumed im-
materiality doctrine is based on a model of economic rationality 
which sometimes will disadvantage risk-averse, affect-driven, 
investing. To the extent that the doctrine acts in this way, 
shares of recoveries in securities class actions and settlements 
will diverge from the demographic characteristics of the all par-
ticipants in capital markets.277 Women and minorities may re-
cover at lower rates than institutional investors, especially to 
the extent that materiality disfavors experiential thinking.278 
 
 273. See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived 
Risk: The White Male Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK & SOCY 159, 159, 170 (2000) 
(noting that the relationship between race and risk perception is complex and 
cannot be explained entirely from a biological perspective). 
 274. See id. at 160; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Perceptions of Risk, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1119, 115760 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEP-
TION OF RISK, supra note 89) (discussing and critiquing data supporting the 
effect). 
 275. See Kathy Bunting, Risk Assessment and Environmental Justice: A 
Critique of the Current Legal Framework and Suggestions for the Future, 3 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 139 (1995) (discussing the tendency of white males to 
perceive less risk). 
 276. James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental 
Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1107 (1994); see also Bunting, supra 
note 275, at 141. 
 277. Studies of class action settlements in other contexts suggest this re-
sult. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large 
Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 747, 76061 (1988) (stating lower-income and less-educated 
claimants recover at disproportionately low rates). 
 278. The problem with this prediction is that it will be difficult to separate 
out the rationality effect from the general trend of increasing participation of 
institutional investors in securities fraud cases. See Jeffrey Mamorsky, Empty 
Nest Eggs, D & O ADVISOR, Sept. 4, 2004, at 12, available at 9/2004 DOADVR 
31 (Westlaw). Dan Markel, a reader of this paper in draft, suggests that 
women and minorities may be likely to participate in mutual funds at higher 
rates than white men, and that the demographic consequences I discuss in the 
text above may be overdrawn. It must be noted that to the extent that men are 
overconfident and risk seeking, increased application of puffery and bespeaks 
caution to deny fraud claims would give an incentive to more prudent inves-
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B. THE DUTY TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER: SOME 
CORPORATE LAW COMPLICATIONS 
The discussion so far has sought to provide metrics with 
which to evaluate the practical effects of changes in judge-made 
securities doctrines on capital market participants. However, 
this doctrinal evolution should also cause corporate law schol-
ars to explore whether some well-accepted truths about corpo-
rate governance are ripe for reevaluation. This section begins 
the task by considering the irony that presumed immateriality 
doctrine effectively increases government regulation of the cor-
porate form to serve a model of investor behavior (market-
based, wealth maximizing, rationality) that supports the edifice 
of private ordering in corporate law in the first instance. 
I began this Article by emphasizing that a basic principle 
of corporate law is that investors buy assets under a no duty 
default rule. This rule has three premises, the first grounded in 
the basic framework of corporate law, the second in an intuition 
about the relationship between law and markets, and the third 
based on enforcement concerns. Understanding that the pre-
sumed immateriality standard has created a duty affecting all 
investors requires us to think about how courts are undermin-
ing or changing each of these foundational assumptions. 
First, the law presumes investors are passive, delegating 
their control rights to the board and management of the enter-
prising they are purchasing.279 Second, the law presumes that 
the best way to encourage economic growth is to encourage 
market transactions in assets. Encumbering assets with duties 
may reduce the value of such assets, discouraging transactions, 
and thus reducing the ability of markets to generate capital for 
participating businesses.280 Third, the law imposes no duties on 
common investors because it is difficult to imagine to whom 
such duties should run. Courts, regulating the corporate form, 
 
tors. This intuition is supported by evidence that some men seem to prefer 
lottery stocks which have lower average returns. See supra notes 26972 and 
accompanying text. However, there is evidence that investors in mutual funds 
are older, wealthier, and better educated than the average American and 
also more likely to be men than women. See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mu-
tual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor Knowledge, and Sources of 
Information, 7 FIN. SERVICES REV. 301, 30306 (1998) (analyzing the demo-
graphics of mutual fund investors). 
 279. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, § 2.04 (discussing the delegation of 
control and the issues it presents). 
 280. See Dalley, supra note 2, at 22122 (discussing the effects of fiduciary 
duties on controlling shareholders). 
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generally reject the idea of public duties owed to individuals in 
society at large with merely potential reliance interests. 
The scope of presumed immateriality requires us to recon-
sider whether courts in the securities context are adhering to 
these assumptions. In particular, courts seem increasingly will-
ing to apply a public duty to participants in the corporate en-
terprise. 
In our legal system, creating duties usually entails creat-
ing correlative rights.281 However, in some circumstances, new 
dutiessuch as the duty not to harm endangered speciesdo 
not give rise to a private right to a cause of action.282 We can 
conceptualize such duties as essentially self-regarding, and en-
forceable, if at all, by society at large.283 Another way to think 
about this problem was suggested by John Austin, who thought 
of duties as correlative not to rights, but to commands: 
Being liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you 
signify, I am bound or obliged by your command, or I lie under a duty 
to obey it. If, in spite of that evil in prospect, I comply not with the 
wish which you signify, I am said to disobey your command, or to vio-
late the duty which it imposes.284 
Thus, we can think of the duty to be a rational share-
holder as an obligation enforced by the evil of the loss of the 
benefit of securities insurance. It is an obligation which bene-
fits society (or the market, or the corporation) but which runs to 
no one. 
While ordinarily a breach of a duty in the corporate context 
creates a right to sue,285 the duty to be a rational shareholder 
creates merely a right to a defense in a given securities litiga-
tion. In this way, presumed immateriality moves corporate law 
towards a regime that embraces the idea of public, instead of 
private, solutions for market failures. It supports an expansion 
 
 281. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP-
TIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) 
(discussing jural relationships); cf. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Old 
Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1469 (2004) (The economic principles 
of scarcity have as their legal offshoot the principle of correlative rights and 
duties. No new rights can be created unless new duties are imposed.). 
 282. See, e.g., John Earl Duke, Note, Giving Species the Benefit of the 
Doubt, 83 B.U. L. REV. 209, 23033 (2003) (discussing the limitation of the 
principle that duties confer rights). 
 283. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 120 (1997) (arguing 
that the state has an exclusive right to certain property law claims). 
 284. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 22 
(Rumble ed. 1995). 
 285. See DOBBS, supra note 13, §§ 31421. 
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of government power and regulation, and reduced enforcement 
through private parties. 
And so what? This issue deserves further thought and 
study. If we are to take seriously the idea of privileging inves-
tor rationality, then it is just as easy to picture a regime where 
we punish investors that exhibit especially egregious irra-
tional behaviorsor, more moderately, imposing a special day 
trader tax.286 If such proposals are too draconian for our 
tastes, why accept presumed immateriality, which creates simi-
lar economic effects? 
 Once we realize that the duty to be rational is an ideo-
logical choice based on the courts model of corporate govern-
ance, we should also question whether this model is a good fit 
for the special purposes and goals of securities law. Is the duty 
to be rational a natural outgrowth of the 1933 or 1934 Securi-
ties Acts, 287 which seek to protect functioning (and presumably 
efficient) markets? Perhaps so, but it is hard to square reduced 
civil enforcement with an evolving congressional policy to in-
crease access by individual investors to the capital markets. 
These questions about the nature of the duty and the 
source of the right, constitute only some of the difficulties posed 
by courts creation of new shareholder obligations. That courts 
are willing to dismiss so many claims based on a failure to be-
have rationally is troubling; that courts have not made the duty 
clear is worse. 
CONCLUSION 
The materiality standards development as a proxy for eco-
nomic rationality parallels related movements in areas of the 
law less commonly associated with wealth creation. The issue 
in some parts of private law adjudication, particularly torts, is 
whether to allow juries to substitute their ideas of reasonable-
ness and retribution for what scholars believe should determine 
reasonableness, i.e., efficiency.288 In evaluating procedural re-
forms, some argue we should transfer the jurys role to bureau- 
 
 
 286. See, LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMER-
ICAS NEWEST EXPORT 162 (2001) (discussing the rationale behind a day trader 
tax). 
 287. Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC §§ 77a-77m (2000); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 USC §§ 78a78kk (2000). 
 288. See generally Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullifi-
catory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 112228. 
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crats, who are better able to assess societal risks and benefits 
rationally.289 
Inevitably, such paternalistic solutions appear an attrac-
tive remedy to the malleability and incoherence of human deci-
sion making. Indeed, as observed earlier, BLE threatens pro-
posals which remove power from citizens and delegitimates 
decisions unrelated to economically rational ends. 
The doctrine of presumed immateriality provides an oppor-
tunity to reflect on this trend. Courts, ignoring BLE insights, 
are nonetheless doing precisely what some BLE scholars would 
have them do: deferring reflexively to the government when it 
sues, and thus empowering government regulators. At the 
same time, as the legal regime shifts its focus from the specific 
facts of each corporations financial state to the disclosures 
language, courts help wealthy defendants at the expense of 
less rational and often poorer, plaintiffs.290 And, as I have ex-
plored, the duty to be a rational shareholder may create demo-
graphic and redistributive effects that courts have not contem-
plated. Finally, presumed immateriality appears to permit 
corporations to intentionally make disclosures they hope and 
expect will engender detrimental reliance while avoiding the 
consequences the securities laws intended to impose.291 Thus, 
current doctrine should satisfy no one. 
There is a possibility that presumed immateriality will 
have increased consequences in the near future. Recent propos-
als seek to privatize social security through the creation of 
individual retirement accounts.292 Under such proposals, pre-
sumed immateriality, which undermines unreasonable inves-
tors protection against fraud, might endanger the retirement 
funds of millions of Americans.293 
 
 289. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 248. 
 290. Less wealthy and sophisticated corporate defendants will also be dis-
advantaged because of their failure to purchase sophisticated counseling re-
garding disclosure. 
 291. Cf. Preston, supra note 168, at 95 (There has never been a better ex-
ample of people having their cake and eating it too than advertisers using 
claims on the assumption that they work, while being protected by the laws 
assumption that they dont.). 
 292. Jeanne Sahadi, Bushs Plan for Social Security, CNNMONEY, Mar. 4, 
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/02/retirement/stofunion_socsec/ (summa-
rizing President Bushs social security reform plan). 
 293. That courts are deferring to the SEC, thus increasing its power, is re-
assuring. And, needless to say, Congress or the SEC may remedy problems 
created by the duty to be rational by appropriate legislation or regulation. 
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What, then, to do? Some have argued that courts ought to 
equate materiality with market effects: when stock prices react 
to disclosures, we should presume that the disclosure was ma-
terial to a reasonable investor.294 Such proposals would make it 
substantially more difficult for courts to impose any given ide-
ology.295 It might also create proper incentives for corporations 
to present information in as clear a way as possible. However, 
the market-materiality proposal appears to assume that Con-
gress intended the securities laws to be a form of insurance, as 
I have suggested, and not a mechanism to protect the market 
itself, as many believe.296 Market-materiality, moreover, could 
result in weaker lawsuits proceeding further in litigation than 
current doctrine permits.297 In short, if this is the solution to 
the problems this Article has uncovered, it may be an impracti-
cal one. 
Fixing the doctrine is only a small part in the larger story, 
which relates to how courts ought to rethink their traditional 
approaches to the construct of the reasonable person. Courts 
have used three basic methods to evaluate reasonableness: (1) 
divine a standard from first principles or previously existing 
 
 294. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 157. 
 295. A good objection to this proposal is to question whether juries are bet-
ter than judges at evaluating investor behavior in ways that are not in tension 
with BLE. There are three responses. First, juries, unlike judges, can evaluate 
materiality along a spectrum, because their ability to compromise on damages 
allows them to calibrate their findings of materiality to their determinations of 
injury. Second, because juries need not explain their decision making, they 
may be less likely to rationalize materiality. Likewise, forcing judges to dis-
cuss what materiality means makes them more likely to find disclosures im-
material. Third, juries are not subject to the problem of docket management, 
and are instead one-off decision makers for whom the institutional pressures 
of time and appellate review are missing. But cf. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 142627 n.19 (2004) (noting that juries one-off mem-
bership renders them immune from the carrots and sticks approach which le-
gal policymakers generally use to prevent bad decisions). 
 296. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of 
the Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 23334 (2003) (The 
goal of the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws is to 
promote capital market integrity and the efficient allocation of capital by en-
suring that investors have the information they need to make informed in-
vestment decisions.). 
 297. As well as being difficult to apply, judges would presumably require 
expensive and litigable event study methodologies before reaching a final deci-
sion. See Roussel, supra note 22, at 1078 n.141 (explaining that event studies 
require extensive factual inquiries into the stocks historical performance and 
the nature of the corporate statements, as well as exclusion of confounding 
events.). 
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operative law, (2) leave the decision of reasonableness to a jury, 
or (3) intuit reasonableness using the judges own experience as 
a guide. This problem arose in many areas of law, from tradi-
tional first-year subjects like contracts, torts, and criminal 
law,298 to regulatory topics like false advertising and employ-
ment discrimination. This Article has shown thatat least in 
the securities contextcourts have used reasonableness as a 
proxy for a normative, behavior-shaping, rationality standard. 
Empirical analysis of courts treatment of reasonableness in 
other areas of law might result in similarly interesting results. 
Whether certain behaviors are or are not ordinary and rea-
sonable need not be resolved by informed judicial hunches. 
Courts have a fourth option: use of experimental evidence of 
human behavior to help guide the relevant decision makers to a 
better understanding of how individuals actually act. This op-
tion is to be preferred. Application of BLE should lead courts to 
a more cautious approach toward presumed immateriality, or, 
at the very least, to greater transparency about their ideologi-
cal goals and the relationship between those goals and the pur-
poses of the securities laws. 
 
 298. See, e.g., Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors, 506 N.W.2d 556, 55762 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993) (considering whether a manufacturers promises of continued em-
ployment in exchange for tax abatements were the kind of statements on 
which a reasonable person would rely). 
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APPENDIX 
DESCIRPTION OF METHODOLOGY USED IN  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERIALITY 
In Part II of this Article, I describe the results of statistical 
testing I performed on a large sample of federal securities cases 
that involved the reasonable shareholder standard of materi-
ality. To select my sample, I ran the following search on the 
Westlaw databases for the Second Circuit, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the Eastern District of New York, the West-
ern District of New York, the Northern District of New York, 
the District of Connecticut, and the District of Vermont: 108 
S.Ct. 978 or 426 U.S. 438 or 485 U.S. 224 or 96 S.Ct. 2126 
and rational! reasonable! lay ordinary intelligen! average /1 
shareholder stockholder investor. This search thus tests for ci-
tations to either TSC Industries299 or Basic300 when courts also 
analyze any of the possible variants on the materiality stan-
dard. I used citations from both the Supreme Court Reporter 
and the United States Reports because different courts might 
use distinct abbreviations and citation forms for case names. 
Limiting the search to the Second Circuit makes sense for 
four reasons. First, the Second Circuit, and more specifically 
the Southern District of New York, are recognized as experts in 
securities law cases.301 Second, the sample provided the largest 
universe of representative cases of any of the federal circuits. 
Third, because the Second Circuit is smaller than the Ninth 
Circuit, district courts in the Second Circuit should be more 
constrained in their interpretation of the materiality standard, 
removing or reducing a possibly confusing variable. Fourth, 
there is some evidence that the Second Circuit is comparatively 
easier on securities class action plaintiffs than the Ninth Cir-
cuit, reducing the risk that I would overrepresent the number 
of findings of presumed immateriality.302  
Some readers of this paper in draft have suggested that an 
expanded database consisting of multiple circuits over a shorter 
period of time would provide a useful robustness check on the 
results I detail in the text. 
 
 299. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44849 (1976).  
 300. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988). 
 301. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 85 n.6.  
 302. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 29, at 142 (indicating that the Ninth 
Circuit is a tougher forum in which to bring securities fraud class actions).  
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The search yielded a data set of 472 opinions. 87 cases 
lacked an identifiable holding that any disclosure was material, 
possibly material, or immaterial. Such cases fall into many 
categories. For example, courts routinely analogize TSC Indus-
tries and Basic in deciding the materiality of contract or com-
mon law fraud claims. Courts also routinely cite the materiality 
standard, but then proceed to decide a securities fraud case on 
different groundse.g., no duty to disclose, lack of standing, 
statute of limitations, and failure to satisfy the in connection 
with requirement. I excluded those 87 cases and coded the re-
maining 385 cases. 
For each case, I marked the following on a separate coding 
sheet: (1) the date, (2) whether the decision was published or 
unpublished, (3) jurisdiction, (4) procedural posture, (5) 
whether there was a finding that any of the disclosures consid-
ered should be dismissed pursuant to presumed immateriality, 
(6) the number of disclosures at issue in the materiality analy-
sis, (7) whether any such disclosures remained for later materi-
ality determination, and (8) the kinds of techniques used to find 
disclosures immaterial as a matter of law. 
I undertook the initial coding. I skimmed each case (ap-
proximately 12,000 pages) until I found the discussion of mate-
riality, and then I read that section with some care. My re-
search assistant, Olga Wayne, entered the data I had written 
onto the coding sheet into a spreadsheet. I asked her to read 
independently each case in which I had marked a finding of 
presumed immateriality. When she disagreed with my initial 
coding, we discussed the case and reached a consensus about a 
proper treatment. This method resulted in discussion of ap-
proximately 100 cases, most of which regarded the number of 
disclosures at issue or the reason given for the courts deter-
mination; my coding methodology was more restrictive than 
Ms. Waynes. I changed approximately ten coding decisions as a 
result of this consultative process. 
I generally coded for applications of a given technique 
based on what the court itself said it was doing. For example, if 
a determination is made in the materiality section, it was 
coded as a materiality determination. However, if a court said 
it was making a materiality determination, while clearly mak-
ing a determination about the nonexistence of a duty to dis-
close, my coding reflected it as a nondetermination of material-
ity. Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort similarly scrutinized 
the text to attempt to discern the real reasons for a courts deci-
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sion.303 Because of structural advantages embedded in the Gu-
lati paper (experience, acumen, and numbers of researchers) it 
is probably fair to assume that their corrections of materiality 
determinations are more accurate in some objective and lim-
ited sense than mine.  
After the initial run of coding, I made an additional run 
through of the dataset to locate cases resolving preliminary in-
junctions before trial, a procedural posture I had originally not 
coded for. The original data collection sheets are in my posses-
sion and are available on request, as is a spreadsheet contain-
ing my coding of each of the cases. Obviously, there are risks in 
engaging in nonblind coding. However, the method was suffi-
cient for the purposes of this preliminary empirical project.  
Admittedly, this dataset is not necessarily representative 
of all court action regarding materiality. There are three kinds 
of problems: sampling, search, and repeated cases. 
First, the Westlaw database is limited to dispositions ac-
companied by opinions. Westlaw collected fewer opinions in the 
past than the present, and even now does not collect all opin-
ions issued by federal district courts. This creates problems for 
empirical research. Courts denying summary judgment or a 
motion to dismiss are less likely to write an opinion because of 
the minimal likelihood of an interlocutory appeal. Thus, my re-
sults may contain a higher proportion of presumed immateri-
ality findings (i.e., granting motions) than actually occurred. 
There may be a further wrinkle, in that motions to dismiss may 
be relatively more likely to result in a published opinion in a 
securities case than a motion for summary judgment.304 Mo-
tions for summary judgment, unlike motions to dismiss, if de-
nied, will often be denied by order (because the court knows 
that post-trial motions are in the wings). Thus, as compared to 
a universe containing all dispositions, I should find a higher 
percentage of findings of presumed immateriality on summary 
judgment versus motions to dismiss.305 
 
 303. See Gulati et al., supra note 29, at 807. For example, the authors 
changed an initial determination of 30 percent fraud by hindsight to 2 per-
cent. Id. 
 304. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 8, at 116 n.94 (concluding that 
securities decisions on motions to dismiss are likely to be published).  
 305. See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 8, at 4143 (discussing problems 
with collection of opinions on Westlaw); cf. Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal 
District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 
782, 79093 (1992) (suggesting, in a study that compared the rates of publica-
tion with filings, that judges may write opinions where cases involv[e] new 
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Second, I only looked for cases that cited to TSC Industries 
or Basic. There are cases analyzing materiality which did not 
cite these landmark decisions.306 I can think of no reason why 
cases citing the Supreme Court standard are more likely to find 
disclosures material or immaterial. Moreover, failing to cite 
these seminal cases suggests a certain degree of haste, and 
would have potentially made it harder to discern a courts rea-
soning. 
Third, some cases appeared at multiple places in my data-
set. I coded for each decision as a separate event. To avoid cor-
rupting the independence assumption, when I undertook re-
gression analyses, I removed repeated cases using a random 
selection method. This resulted in a reduced database of 348 
cases. 
Thus, my study produces a preliminary evaluation of how 
materiality has evolved in courts opinions; these results may 
only loosely correspond to what courts are doing in the larger 
world. Notwithstanding these problems, other authors analyz-
ing the application of the securities law in the district courts 
used collection methodologies similar to mine.307  
 
legal issues). 
 306. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (analyzing ma-
teriality, announcing the bespeaks-caution doctrine, but not citing either TSC 
or Basic).  
 307. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 29, at 39. 
 
